History of European Morals From Augustus to Charlemagne (Vol. 1 of 2) — John Shaqi
History of European Morals From Augustus to Charlemagne (Vol. 1 of 2)Lecky, William Edward Hartpole
Philosophy
History of European Morals From Augustus to Charlemagne (Vol. 1 of 2)
Lecky, William Edward Hartpole
Ethics; Europe -- Moral conditions
No Epicurean could avow before a popular audience that
the one end of his life was the pursuit of his own happiness without an
outburst of indignation and contempt.(65) No man could consciously make
this—which according to the selfish theory is the only rational and indeed
possible motive of action—the deliberate object of all his undertakings,
without his character becoming despicable and degraded. Whether we look
within ourselves or examine the conduct either of our enemies or of our
friends, or adjudicate upon the characters in history or in fiction, our
feelings on these matters are the same. In exact proportion as we believe
a desire for personal enjoyment to be the motive of a good act is the
merit of the agent diminished. If we believe the motive to be wholly
selfish the merit is altogether destroyed. If we believe it to be wholly
disinterested the merit is altogether unalloyed. Hence, the admiration
bestowed upon Prometheus, or suffering virtue constant beneath the blows
of Almighty malice, or on the atheist who with no prospect of future
reward suffered a fearful death, rather than abjure an opinion which could
be of no benefit to society, because he believed it to be the truth.
Selfish moralists deny the possibility of that which all ages, all
nations, all popular judgments pronounce to have been the characteristic
of every noble act that has ever been performed. Now, when a philosophy
which seeks by the light of consciousness to decipher the laws of our
moral being proves so diametrically opposed to the conclusions arrived at
by the great mass of mankind, who merely follow their consciousness
without endeavouring to frame systems of philosophy, that it makes most of
the distinctions of common ethical language absolutely unmeaning, this is,
to say the least, a strong presumption against its truth. If Molière’s
hero had been speaking prose all his life without knowing it, this was
simply because he did not understand what prose was. In the present case
we are asked to believe that men have been under a total delusion about
the leading principles of their lives which they had distinguished by a
whole vocabulary of terms.
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