56 This position is elaborated in a passage too long for quotation by Mr. Austin. (_Lectures on Jurisprudence_, vol. i. p. 44.) 57 Hobbes defines conscience as “the opinion of evidence” (_On Human Nature_, ch. vi. §8). Locke as “our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions” (_Essay_, book i. ch. iii. § 8). In Bentham there is very little on the subject; but in one place he informs us that “conscience is a thing of fictitious existence, supposed to occupy a seat in the mind” (_Deontology_, vol. i. p. 137); and in another he ranks “love of duty” (which he describes as an “impossible motive, in so far as duty is synonymous to obligation”) as a variety of the “love of power” (_Springs of Action_, ii.) Mr. Bain says, “conscience is an imitation within ourselves of the government without us.” (_Emotions and Will_, p. 313.) 58 “However much they [utilitarians] may believe (as they do) that actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue, yet this being granted ... they not only place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means to the ultimate end, but they also recognise as a psychological fact the possibility of its being to the individual a good in itself.... Virtue, according to the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end, but it is capable of becoming so.... What was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of happiness has come to be desired ... as part of happiness.... Human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness.”—J. S. Mill’s _Utilitarianism_, pp. 54, 55, 56, 58.