eminence, have been during their lifetime unpopular, chiefly in society with their equals, and to a certain extent with others also; while after their decease, they have left such a reputation as to make people claim kindred with them falsely, and to induce their country to boast of them, not as though they were aliens or wrongdoers, but as her own citizens and as men who did her honor. It is this glory which I desire, and in pursuit of which I incur such reproaches for my private conduct. Yet look at my public conduct, and see whether it will not bear comparison with that of any other citizen. I brought together the most powerful states in Peloponnesus without any serious cost or hazard to you, and made the Lacedæmonians peril their all at Mantineia on the fortune of one day: a peril so great, that, though victorious, they have not even yet regained their steady belief in their own strength.” “Thus did my youth, and my so-called monstrous folly, find suitable words to address the Peloponnesian powers, and earnestness to give them confidence and obtain their coöperation. Be not now, therefore, afraid of this youth of mine: but so long an I possess it in full vigor, and so long as Nikias retains his reputation for good fortune, turn us each to account in our own way.”[225] [225] Thucyd. vi, 16, 17. Having thus vindicated himself personally, Alkibiadês went on to deprecate any change of the public resolution already taken. The Sicilian cities, he said, were not so formidable as was represented. Their population was numerous, indeed, but fluctuating, turbulent, often on the move, and without local attachment. No man there considered himself as a permanent resident, nor cared to defend the city in which he dwelt; nor were there arms or organization for such a purpose. The native Sikels, detesting Syracuse, would willingly lend their aid to her assailants. As to the Peloponnesians, powerful as they were, they were not more desperate enemies now than they had been in former days:[226] they might invade Attica by land whether the Athenians sailed to Sicily or not; but they could do no mischief by sea, for Athens would still have in reserve a navy sufficient to restrain them. What valid ground was there, therefore, to evade performing obligations which Athens had sworn to her Sicilian allies? To be sure, _they_ could bring no help to Attica in return; but Athens did not want them on her own side of the water; she wanted them in Sicily, to prevent her Sicilian enemies from coming over to attack her. She had originally acquired her empire by a readiness to interfere wherever she was invited; nor would she have made any progress, if she had been backward or prudish in scrutinizing such invitations. She could not now set limits to the extent of her imperial sway; she was under a necessity not merely to retain her present subjects, but to lay snares for new subjects, on pain of falling into dependence herself if she ceased to be imperial. Let