her then persist in the resolution adopted, and strike terror into the Peloponnesians by undertaking this great expedition. She would probably conquer all Sicily; at least she would humble Syracuse: in case even of failure, she could always bring back her troops, from her unquestionable superiority at sea. The stationary and inactive policy recommended by Nikias was not less at variance with the temper, than with the position, of Athens, and would be ruinous to her if pursued. Her military organization would decline, and her energies would be wasted in internal rub and conflict, instead of that steady activity and acquisition which had become engrafted upon her laws and habits, which could not be now renounced, even if bad in itself, without speedy destruction.[227] [226] Thucyd. vi, 17. Καὶ νῦν οὔτε ἀνέλπιστοί πω μᾶλλον Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς ἡμᾶς ἐγένοντο, εἴτε καὶ πάνυ ἔῤῥωνται, etc. The construction of ἀνέλπιστοι here is not certain: yet I cannot think that the meaning which Dr. Arnold and others assign to it is the most suitable. It rather seems to mean the same as in vii, 4, and vii, 47: “enemies beyond our hopes of being able to deal with.” [227] Thucyd. vi, 16-19. Such was substantially the reply of Alkibiadês to Nikias. The debate was now completely reopened, so that several speakers addressed the assembly on both sides; more, however, decidedly in favor of the expedition than against it. The alarmed Egestæans and Leontines renewed their supplications, appealing to the plighted faith of the city: probably also those Athenians who had visited Egesta, again stood forward to protest against what they would call the ungenerous doubts and insinuations of Nikias. By all these appeals, after considerable debate, the assembly was so powerfully moved, that their determination to send the fleet became more intense than ever; and Nikias, perceiving that farther direct opposition was useless, altered his tactics. He now attempted a manœuvre, designed indirectly to disgust his countrymen with the plan, by enlarging upon its dangers and difficulties, and insisting upon a prodigious force as indispensable to surmount them. Nor was he without hopes that they might be sufficiently disheartened by such prospective hardships, to throw up the scheme altogether. At any rate, if they persisted, he himself as commander would thus be enabled to execute it with completeness and confidence.