and sedition broke out among the Peloponnesian allies who formed the far larger part of the garrison. These Peloponnesians, refusing to fight longer, insisted upon capitulating; which the Lacedæmonian governor was obliged perforce to do, though both he and the Spartans along with him desired to hold out to the death. The Kadmeia was accordingly surrendered, and the garrison went back to Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta arrived only a little too late. All these circumstances stated by Diodorus are not only completely different from Xenophon, but irreconcilable with his conception of the event. We must reject either the one or the other. Now Xenophon is not merely the better witness of the two, but is in this case sustained by all the collateral probabilities of the case. 1. Diodorus represents the Athenians as having despatched by public vote, assistance to Thebes, in order to requite the assistance which the Thebans had before sent to restore the Athenian democracy against the Thirty. Now this is incorrect in point of fact. The Thebans had _never sent any assistance_, positive or ostensible, to Thrasybulus and the Athenian democrats against the Thirty. They had assisted Thrasybulus underhand, and without any public government-act; and they had refused to serve along with the Spartans against him. But they never sent any force to help him against the Thirty. Consequently, the Athenians _could not_ now have sent any public force to Thebes, _in requital_ for a similar favor done before by the Thebans to them. 2. Had the Athenians passed a formal vote, sent a large public army, and taken vigorous part in several bloody assaults on the Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia,—this would have been the most flagrant and unequivocal commencement of hostilities against Sparta. No Spartan envoys could, after that, have gone to Athens, and stayed safely in the house of the Proxenus,—as we know from Xenophon that they did. Besides,—the story of Sphodrias (presently to be recounted) proves distinctly that Athens was at peace with Sparta, and had committed no act of hostility against her, for three or four months at least after the revolution at Thebes. It therefore refutes the narrative of Diodorus about the public vote of the Athenians, and the public Athenian force under Demophon, aiding in the attack of the Kadmeia. Strange to say,—Diodorus himself, three chapters afterwards (xv, 29), relates this story about Sphodrias, just in the same manner (with little difference) as Xenophon; ushering in the story with a declaration, that _the Athenians were still at peace with Sparta_, and forgetting that he had himself recounted a distinct rupture of that peace on the part of the Athenians.