During this interval, momentous events (recounted in my previous
chapters) had occurred in Central Greece. In 382 B. C., the Spartans
made themselves by fraud masters of Thebes, and placed a permanent
garrison in the Kadmeia. In 380 B. C., they put down the Olynthian
confederacy, thus attaining the maximum of their power. But in 379
B. C., there occurred the revolution at Thebes achieved by the
conspiracy of Pelopidas, who expelled the Lacedæmonians from the
Kadmeia. Involved in a burdensome war against Thebes and Athens,
together with other allies the Lacedæmonians gradually lost ground,
and had become much reduced before the peace of 371 B. C., which left
them to contend with Thebes alone. Then came the fatal battle of
Leuktra which prostrated their military ascendency altogether. These
incidents have been already related at large in former chapters. Two
years before the battle of Leuktra, Dionysius sent to the aid of the
Lacedæmonians at Korkyra a squadron of ten ships, all of which were
captured by Iphikrates; about three years after the battle, when
the Thebans and their allies were pressing Sparta in Peloponnesus,
he twice sent thither a military force of Gauls and Iberians to
reinforce her army. But his troops neither stayed long, nor rendered
any very conspicuous service.[89]
[89] Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2, 4, 33; vii i. 20-28. Diodor. xv. 70.
In this year we hear of a fresh attack by Dionysius against the
Carthaginians. Observing that they had been lately much enfeebled
by pestilence and by mutiny of their African subjects, he thought
the opportunity favorable for trying to recover what the peace of
383 B. C., had obliged him to relinquish. A false pretence being
readily found, he invaded the Carthaginian possessions in the west of
Sicily with a large land force of thirty thousand foot, and three
thousand horse; together with a fleet of three hundred sail, and
store ships in proportion. After ravaging much of the open territory
of the Carthaginians, he succeeded in mastering Selinus, Entella, and
Eryx—and then laid siege to Lilybæum. This town, close to the western
cape of Sicily,[90] appears to have arisen as a substitute for the
neighboring town of Motyê (of which we hear little more since its
capture by Dionysius in 396 B. C.), and to have become the principal
Carthaginian station. He began to attack it by active siege and
battering machines. But it was so numerously garrisoned, and so well
defended, that he was forced to raise the siege and confine himself
to blockade. His fleet kept the harbor guarded, so as to intercept
supplies from Africa. Not long afterwards, however, he received
intelligence that a fire had taken place in the port of Carthage
whereby all her ships had been burnt. Being thus led to conceive that
there was no longer any apprehension of naval attack from Carthage,
he withdrew his fleet from continuous watch off Lilybæum; keeping
one hundred and thirty men-of-war near at hand, in the harbor of
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