No victory recorded in history was ever more complete in itself, or
more far-stretching in its consequences, than that of Issus. Not
only was the Persian force destroyed or dispersed, but the efforts
of Darius for recovery were paralyzed by the capture of his family.
Portions of the dissipated army of Issus may be traced, re-appearing
in different places for operations of detail; but we shall find no
farther resistance to Alexander and his main force, except from the
brave freemen of two fortified cities. Everywhere an overwhelming
sentiment of admiration and terror was spread abroad, towards the
force, skill, or good fortune of Alexander, by whichever name it
might be called—together with contempt for the real value of a
Persian army, in spite of so much imposing pomp and numerical show; a
contempt, not new to intelligent Greeks, but now communicated even to
vulgar minds by the recent unparalleled catastrophe. Both as general
and as soldier, indeed, the consummate excellence of Alexander stood
conspicuous, not less than the signal deficiency of Darius. The fault
in the latter, upon which most remark is usually made, was, that of
fighting the battle, not in an open plain, but in a narrow valley,
whereby his superiority of number was rendered unprofitable. But this
(as I have already observed) was only one among many mistakes, and
by no means the most serious. The result would have been the same,
had the battle been fought in the plains to the eastward of Mount
Amanus. Superior numbers are of little avail on any ground unless
there be a general who knows how to make use of them; unless they be
distributed into separate divisions ready to combine for offensive
action on many points at once, or at any rate to lend support to each
other in defence, so that a defeat of one fraction is not a defeat
of the whole. The faith of Darius in simple multitude was altogether
blind and childish;[288] nay, that faith, though overweening
beforehand, disappeared at once when he found his enemies did not run
away, but faced him boldly—as was seen by his attitude on the banks
of the Pinarus, where he stood to be attacked instead of executing
his threat of treading down the handful opposed to him.[289] But it
was not merely as a general, that Darius acted in such a manner as
to render the loss of the battle certain. Had his dispositions been
ever so skilful, his personal cowardice, in quitting the field and
thinking only of his own safety, would have sufficed to nullify their
effect.[290] Though the Persian grandees are generally conspicuous
for personal courage, yet we shall find Darius hereafter again
exhibiting the like melancholy timidity, and the like incompetence
for using numbers with effect, at the battle of Arbela, though fought
in a spacious plain chosen by himself.
[288] See this faith put forward in the speech of Xerxes—Herodot.
vii. 48; compare the speech of Achæmenes, vii. 236.
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