In 694, it will be remembered, rumours of an invasion of the Helvetii prevailed at Rome. All political pre-occupation ceased at once, and resort was had to the exceptional measures adopted under such circumstances.[26] In fact, as a principle, whenever a war against the Gauls was imminent, a dictator was immediately nominated, and a levy _en masse_ ordered. From that time no one was exempted from military service; and, as a provision against an attack of those barbarians, a special treasure had been deposited in the Capitol, which it was forbidden to touch except in that eventuality.[27] Accordingly, when, in 705, Cæsar seized upon it, he replied to the protests of the tribunes that, since Gaul was subjugated, this treasure had become useless.[28] War against the peoples beyond the Alps was thus, for Rome, the consequence of a long antagonism, which must necessarily end in a desperate struggle, and the ruin of one of the two adversaries. This explains, at the same time, both Cæsar’s ardour and the enthusiasm excited by his successes. Wars undertaken in accord with the traditional sentiment of a country have alone the privilege of moving deeply the fibre of the people, and the importance of a victory is measured by the greatness of the disaster which would have followed a defeat. Since the fall of Carthage, the conquests in Spain, in Africa, in Syria, in Asia, and in Greece, enlarged the Republic, but did not consolidate it, and a check in those different parts of the world would have diminished the power of Rome without compromising it. With the peoples of the North, on the contrary, her existence was at stake, and upon her reverses equally as upon her successes depended the triumph of barbarism or civilisation. If Cæsar had been vanquished by the Helvetii or the Germans, who can say what would have become of Rome, assailed by the numberless hordes of the North rushing eagerly upon Italy? And thus no war excited the public feeling so intensely as that of Gaul. Though Pompey had carried the Roman eagles to the shores of the Caspian Sea, and, by the tributes he had imposed on the vanquished, doubled the revenues of the State, his triumphs had only obtained ten days of thanksgivings. The Senate decreed fifteen,[29] and even twenty,[30] for Cæsar’s victories, and, in honour of them, the people offered sacrifices during sixty days.[31] When, therefore, Suetonius ascribes the inspiration of the campaigns of this great man to the mere desire of enriching himself with plunder, he is false to history and to good sense, and assigns the most vulgar motive to a noble design. When other historians ascribe to Cæsar the sole intention of seeking in Gaul a means of rising to the supreme power by civil war, they show, as we have remarked elsewhere, a distorted view; they judge events by their final result, instead of calmly estimating the causes which have produced them.