History of Roman Literature from its Earliest Period to the Augustan Age. Vol. IIDunlop, John Colin
History
History of Roman Literature from its Earliest Period to the Augustan Age. Vol. II
Dunlop, John Colin
Latin literature -- History and criticism
Plato, in his mode of communicating instruction, and promulgating his
opinions, had not strictly adhered to the method of his master Socrates.
He held the concurrence of memory, with a recent impression, to be a
criterion of truth, and he taught that opinions might be formed from the
comparison of a present with a recollected perception. But his successors,
both in the Academy and Lyceum, departed from the Socratic method still
more widely. They renounced the maxim, of affirming nothing; and instead
of explaining everything with a doubting reserve, they converted
philosophy, as it were, into an art, and formed a system of opinions,
which they delivered to their disciples as the peculiar tenets of their
sect. They inculcated the belief, that our knowledge has its origin in the
senses—that the senses themselves do not judge of truth, but the mind
through them beholds things as they really are—that is, it perceives the
ideas which always subsist in the same state, without change; so that the
senses, through the medium of the mind, may be relied on for the
ascertainment of truth. Such was the state of opinions and instruction in
the Academy when Arcesilaus, who was the sixth master of that school from
Plato, and in his youth had heard the lessons of Pyrrho the sceptic,
resolved to reform the dogmatic system into which his predecessors had
fallen, and to restore, as he conceived, in all its purity, the Socratic
system of affirming nothing with certainty. This founder of the New, or
Middle Academy as it is sometimes called, denied even the certain truth of
the proposition that we know nothing, which Socrates had reserved as an
exception to his general principle. While admitting that there is an
actual certainty in the nature of things, he rejected the evidence both of
the senses and reason as positive testimony; and as he denied that there
existed any infallible criterion of truth or falsehood, he maintained that
no wise man ought to give any proposition whatever the sanction of his
assent. He differed from the Sceptics or Pyrrhonists only in this, that he
admitted degrees of probability, whereas the Sceptics fluctuated in total
uncertainty.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account