the objections which he urged against justice, or rather against the existence of a due sense of that quality, was, that if such a thing as justice were to be found on earth, the Romans would resign their conquests, and return to their huts and original poverty(378). Cato likewise appears to have had a considerable spirit of personal jealousy and rivalry; while, at the same time, his national pride led him to scorn all the arts of a country which the Roman arms had subdued. Carneades promulgated his opinions only in his eloquent lectures; and it is not known that he left any writings of importance behind him(379). But his oral instructions had made a permanent impression on the Roman youth, and the want of a written record of his principles was amply supplied by his successor Clitomachus, who was by birth a Carthaginian, and was originally called Asdrubal. He had fled from his own country to Athens during the siege of Carthage, by the Romans, in the third Punic war(380); and in the year 623 he went from Greece to Italy, to succeed Carneades in the school which he had there established. Clitomachus was a most voluminous author, having written not less than four ample treatises on the necessity of withholding the assent from every proposition whatever. One of these tracts was dedicated to Lucilius, the satiric poet(381), and another to the Consul Censorinus. The essence of the principles which he maintained in these works, has been extracted by Cicero, and handed down to us in a passage inserted in the _Academica_. It is there said, that the resemblances of things are of such a nature that some of them appear probable, and others not; but this is no sufficient ground for supposing that some objects may be correctly perceived, since many falsities are probable, whereas no falsity can be accurately perceived or known: The Academy never attempted to deprive mankind of the use of their senses, by denying that there are such things as colour, taste, and sound; but it denied that there exists in these qualities any criterion or characteristic of truth and certainty. A wise man, therefore, is said, in a double sense, to withhold his assent; in one sense, when it is understood that he absolutely assents to no proposition; in another, when he suspends answering a question, without either denying or affirming. He ought never to assent implicitly to any proposition, and his answer should be withheld until, according to _probability_, he is in a condition to reply in the affirmative or negative. But as Cicero admits, that a wise man, who, on every occasion, suspends his assent, may yet be impelled and moved to action, he leaves him in full possession of those motives which excite to action, together with a power of answering in the affirmative or negative to certain questions, and of following the probability of objects; yet still without giving them his assent(382).