here content myself with remarking, that even if we adopt the Reviewer's expressions, we must still contend that there are _different forms_ of the _impulse of the mind to generalize_, corresponding to each of the Fundamental Ideas of our system. These Fundamental Ideas, if they be nothing else, must at least be accepted as a classification of the modes of action of the Inductive Propensity,--as so many different paths and tendencies of the Generalizing Impulse: and the Axioms which I have stated as the express results of the Fundamental Ideas, and as the steps by which those Ideas make universal truths possible, are still no less worthy of notice, if they are stated as the results of our Generalizing Impulse; and as the steps by which that Impulse, in its many various forms, makes universal truths possible. The Generalizing Impulse in that operation by which it leads us to the Axioms of Geometry, and to those of Mechanics, takes very different courses; and these courses may well deserve to be separately studied. And perhaps, even if we accept this view of the philosophy of our knowledge, no simpler or clearer way can be found of describing and distinguishing these fundamentally different operations of the Inductive Propensity, than by saying, {194} that in the one case it proceeds according to the Idea of Space, in another according to the Idea of Mechanical Cause; and the like phraseology may be employed for all the other cases. This then being understood, my present object is to consider some very remarkable, and, as appears to me, novel views of the Idea of Cause which the Reviewer propounds. And these may be best brought under our discussion by considering them as an attempt to solve the question, Whether, according to our fundamental apprehensions of the relation of Cause and Effect, effect follows cause in the order of time, or is simultaneous with it.