History of the inductive sciences, from the earliest to the present timeWhewell, William
History
History of the inductive sciences, from the earliest to the present time
Whewell, William
Science -- History
Pappus (who lived about A. D. 400) was one of the best
mathematicians of the Alexandrian school; and, on subjects where his
ideas were so indistinct, it is not likely that any much clearer
were to be found in the minds of his contemporaries. Accordingly, on
all subjects of speculative mechanics, there appears to have been an
entire confusion and obscurity of thought till modern times. Men's
minds were busy in endeavoring to systematize the distinctions and
subtleties of the Aristotelian school, concerning Motion and Power;
and, being thus employed among doctrines in which there was involved
no definite meaning capable of real exemplification, they, of
course, could not acquire sound physical knowledge. We have already
seen that the physical opinions of Aristotle, even as they came from
him, had no proper scientific precision. His followers, in their
endeavors to perfect and develop his statements, never attempted to
introduce clearer ideas than those of their master; and as they
never referred, in any steady manner, to facts, the vagueness of
their notions was not corrected by any collision with observation.
The physical doctrines which they extracted from Aristotle were, in
the course of time, built up into a regular system; and though these
doctrines could not be followed into a practical application without
introducing distinctions and changes, such as deprived the terms of
all steady signification, the dogmas continued to be repeated, till
the world was persuaded that they were self-evident; and when, at a
later period, experimental philosophers, such as Galileo and Boyle,
ventured to contradict these current maxims, their new principles
sounded in men's ears as strange as they now sound familiar. Thus
Boyle promulgated his opinions on the mechanics of fluids, as
"Hydrostatical _Paradoxes_, proved and illustrated by experiments."
And the opinions which he there opposes, are those which the
Aristotelian philosophers habitually propounded as certain {190} and
indisputable; such, for instance, as that "in fluids the upper parts
do not gravitate on the lower;" that "a lighter fluid will not
gravitate on a heavier;" that "levity is a positive quality of
bodies as well as gravity." So long as these assertions were left
uncontested and untried, men heard and repeated them, without
perceiving the incongruities which they involved: and thus they long
evaded refutation, amid the vague notions and undoubting habits of
the stationary period. But when the controversies of Galileo's time
had made men think with more acuteness and steadiness, it was
discovered that many of these doctrines were inconsistent with
themselves, as well as with experiment. We have an example of the
confusion of thought to which the Aristotelians were liable, in
their doctrine concerning falling bodies. "Heavy bodies," said they,
"must fall quicker than light ones; for weight is the cause of their
fall, and the weight of the greater bodies is greater." They did not
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