History of the inductive sciences, from the earliest to the present timeWhewell, William
History
History of the inductive sciences, from the earliest to the present time
Whewell, William
Science -- History
Such common Notions are sufficient for the common practical conduct
of human life: but man is not a practical creature merely; he has
within him a _speculative_ tendency, a pleasure in the contemplation
of ideal relations, a love of knowledge as knowledge. It is this
speculative tendency which brings to light the difference of common
Notions and scientific Ideas, of which we have spoken. The mind
analyzes such Notions, reasons upon them, combines and connects
them; for it feels assured that intellectual things ought to be able
to bear such handling. Even practical knowledge, we see clearly, is
not possible without the use of the reason; and the speculative
reason is only the reason satisfying itself of its own consistency.
The speculative faculty cannot be controlled from acting. The mind
cannot but claim a right to speculate concerning all its own acts
and creations; yet, when it exercises this right upon its common
practical notions, we find that it runs into barren abstractions and
ever-recurring cycles of subtlety. Such Notions are like waters
naturally stagnant; however much we urge and agitate them, they only
revolve in stationary {50} whirlpools. But the mind is capable of
acquiring scientific Ideas, which are better fitted to undergo
discussion and impulsion. When our speculations are duly fed from
the springheads of Observation, and frequently drawn off into the
region of Applied Science, we may have a living stream of consistent
and progressive knowledge. That science may be both real as to its
import, and logical as to its form, the examples of many existing
sciences sufficiently prove.
_School Philosophy_.--So long, however, as attempts are made to form
sciences, without such a verification and realization of their
fundamental ideas, there is, in the natural series of speculation,
no self-correcting principle. A philosophy constructed on notions
obscure, vague, and unsubstantial, and held in spite of the want of
correspondence between its doctrines and the actual train of
physical events, may long subsist, and occupy men's minds. Such a
philosophy must depend for its permanence upon the pleasure which
men feel in tracing the operations of their own and other men's
minds, and in reducing them to logical consistency and systematical
arrangement.
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