The following were the dispositions for the attack. The reader, on examining the plan, will see that the two corps opposed to our forces, which were at Latowicz (_c_), were too far advanced, which exposed them to be turned on their left wing, and even taken in the rear, if our forces there should succeed in driving back the forces (_e_) of the enemy on the road (_d_) from Latowicz by Wodynie to Siedlce. To execute this movement the order was given that when the first division of infantry (_f_), supported by twenty-four pieces of cannon, should commence the attack upon the great road opposite Boimie, the third division (_g_), having with them the brigade of cavalry of Kicki, should leave the position at Latowicz before day-break, and take the direction of Wodynie, to attack the forces which it might find there; but if those forces should be found greatly superior, the division was to remain in a strong position at Jeruzalem (_h_). If it should succeed in driving back the enemy's forces, it was to take the road on the left, leading from Wodynie through Iganie (_i_) to Siedlce. Every effort was to be directed to the point of arriving as soon as possible upon the dyke (_k_) at Iganie, which leads over the marshes of the river Sucha (_l_). By a prompt manoeuvre of this kind, the enemy could not, as we have said, escape being turned. For the better execution of this plan, the enemy was to be harassed on the main road, in order that general Prondzynski, who was to command the expedition to Wodynie, might have time to manoeuvre upon the enemy's flank. A division of cavalry (_m_), under the command of general Stryinski, was to leave Boimie, and take a direction on the left, towards the village of Gruszki, to pass there the fords of the river Kostrzyn, and in case of the retreat of the enemy, to fall upon his right wing. Having issued these instructions, and confided the command of the little corps which was to act upon the enemy's left wing at Wodynie, to general Prondzynski, the general in chief left himself for Boimie, to lead the attack in person upon the main road. As was the case in the position at Boimie, [_Refer to Plan_ II,] we were separated from the enemy by the marshes of the river Kostrzyn. The two ruined bridges upon the dyke not permitting either ourselves or the enemy to pass, general Skrzynecki contented himself with opening a fire of artillery upon the Russian position, in order to occupy the attention of the enemy, while preparations were making to repair the bridges sufficiently to admit a passage.