ordered to remove to a still greater distance, a disposition for which we can conceive no possible motive. On the 19th of June, the day on which general Gielgud commenced his attack on Wilno, general Dembinski was thus employed on his march, without an object, to Podbrzeze. BATTLE OF WILNO. [_Plan_ XXXV.] The battle of Wilno was, in point of tactics, simply a strong attack upon the Russian centre (A), with the view, by forcing it, to pass on to the occupation of the city. The adoption of such a plan supposes an ignorance of the nature of the position of the enemy, and of the strength of his forces.[73] Indeed any plan of attacking this city on its strongest side, that toward Kowno, was almost impossible of execution. [Illustration: _XXXV. p. 312_] [Illustration: _XXXIII. p. 296_] The battle commenced on the morning of the 19th of June. The enemy was dislodged from his first position, which was about one mile from the city. Their retreat was caused by a spirited charge, by the 1st regiment of lancers, upon the Russian artillery, and the columns of infantry in the centre. The enemy, on quitting this position, took another of great strength on the heights called Gory-Konarskie (B). This strong position was already covered with fortifications. The right wing of the enemy (C), composed of strong columns of infantry (_a_), rested on the river Wiliia; the centre, (A), embracing all their artillery, which consisted of 50 pieces of cannon (_b_), occupied the heights above mentioned; the declivity of those heights was covered with sharp-shooters (_d_), concealed behind small heaps of earth, thrown up for this purpose. The left wing of the enemy (D) was entirely composed of cavalry (_e_).