This battle discovered an extreme of negligence in our commander in chief. With the knowledge that the enemy was pursuing us in the rear, and on each side, we remained uselessly encamped during the night of the 7th, which we ought to have employed in the attack. The true course should have been to have set fire to the place, which would have required only the agency of a few bold men. This town, indeed, deserved no better fate; for it was inhabited almost exclusively by hostile Jews. When the general welfare is at risk, there should be no hesitation in sacrificing the convenience of individuals. If we compare the consequences of having burnt this town, and of having attacked it, we shall see that, by the former course, we should have compelled the Jews to fly with their effects, and the Russian garrison to surrender, without any effusion of blood, while, by attacking it, we lost nearly one thousand men, without any advantage whatever. In regard to the attack, the surrounding of the town was a great fault; for neither the fire of the artillery nor of the light troops could be effective, as the Russian artillery was in a dominant position, and was concealed within the city, as their infantry was behind their entrenchments. The skirmishers, in approaching the city, fell, without having harmed the enemy. The plan of colonel Pientka, of masking the attack on one side, and forcing the attack upon the other, at a single point, was well conceived, but failed, as we have seen, by the want of support. At about ten o'clock the flanking parties of the Russian cavalry began to show themselves on each side of us, upon the road to Wilkomierz, and on that of Cytowiany. Our corps was already on the march for Kurszany. The 1st regiment of lancers and the light artillery were designated as a rear-guard. This rear-guard, taking advantage of a small defile, which presented a favorable position, took post there, and sustained themselves for some hours against an attack from the Russian advanced guard; thus protecting the march of our main body, which was executed with the greatest order. The lancers and light artillery then evacuated their position, by a retreat at full speed, which, by taking advantage of the windings of the road, and the vicinity of the forests, they were able to effect with inconsiderable loss. On the evening of the same day, we arrived at Kurszany. On the next day we remained some hours in that place, to hold a council of war. General Chlapowski proposed to divide our forces into three corps, each to act independently. This arrangement was carried into effect, and our forces were thus distributed. The 1st corps, under general Chlapowski, with which general Gielgud remained, consisted of five battalions of infantry, amounting to 1,500 men; four squadrons of the 1st regiment of lancers, and two squadrons of Kaliszian cavalry; in all, 450 horse, and an artillery consisting of 13 pieces of cannon.