When on the 12th of October Sheridan received Grant's definite instructions for the movement on Gordonsville and Charlottesville, he ceased to offer any further opposition, yet, realizing that he would need his whole force, he withdrew the order for Wright's movement to Alexandria and sent him word to come back to Cedar Creek. The head of Wright's column was wading the Shenandoah when these orders overtook it. Wright at once faced about, and on the next day, the 14th of October, went into camp behind the lines of Cedar Creek on the right and rear of Emory. No change was made in the positions of the other troops, because, until Sheridan's return from Washington, the policy and plan of the campaign must remain unsettled, and Wright might at any moment be called upon to resume his march. On the 15th of October Sheridan received formal instructions from Grant, limiting the proposed movement on Charlottesville and Gordonsville to a serious menace, instead of an occupation, and again reducing the call for troops to a single division of cavalry. Sheridan at once sent Merritt in motion toward Chester Gap, directing Powell to follow, and he himself rode with Merritt to Front Royal, meaning to pay his postponed visit to the Secretary of War at Washington; but on the 16th, before quitting Front Royal, he was overtaken by an officer from Wright bringing the words of the strange message read off by our signal officers from the waving flags of the Confederates in plain sight on the crest of Three Top Mountain.(2) This message purported to have been sent by Longstreet to Early. "Be ready," it said, "to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan." The true story of this despatch has not until now been made public,(3) and many are the surmises, clever or stupid, that have been wasted upon the mystery. In fact, the message was, as both Sheridan and Wright naturally inferred, a trick intended to deceive them; Early thought to induce them to move back without waiting for the attack which, with his reduced strength, he wished to avoid. The effect was to put the Union commanders on their guard against what was actually about to happen. Therefore Sheridan instantly turned back all the cavalry save one regiment, which he kept for an escort, and rode on to Rectortown, and so went by rail to Washington--first, however, taking the precaution to warn Wright to strengthen his position, to close in Powell from Front Royal, to look well to the ground, and to be prepared. In his official report of the campaign, Sheridan, speaking of the events now to be related, said: "This surprise was owing probably to not closing in Powell or that the cavalry divisions of Merritt and Custer were placed at the right of our line, where it had always occurred to me there was but little danger of attack." But it is important to observe and remember that although Wright, in sending Longstreet's message, had remarked--