"If the enemy should be strongly reinforced in cavalry he might, by turning my right, give us a great deal of trouble. . . . I shall only fear an attack on my right," yet Sheridan in his reply made no allusion to any difference of opinion on his part as to the place of danger. His instructions to close in Powell, Torbert, under Wright's direction, executed by calling in Moore's brigade to cover Buckton's Ford, on the left and rear of Crook. Powell, with the rest of his division, was left at Front Royal to hold off Lomax. Sheridan went on to Washington. Arriving there on the morning of the 17th, he at once asked for a special train to take him to Martinsburg at noon, and having, between a late breakfast and an early luncheon, transacted all his business at the War Office, including the conversion of the government to his views, set out to rejoin his command. With him went two engineer officers, Alexander and Thom, with whom he was to consult as to the best point, if any, in the lower valley to be fortified and held; for this venerable error was not dead, merely sleeping. Torbert rejoined the army at Cedar Creek on the 16th, and Merritt took up his old position on the right. On the same night Rosser took one of his brigades with a brigade of infantry mounted behind the horsemen, and, supported by the whole of Early's army, set out to capture the outlying brigade of Custer's division, but found instead a single troop on picket duty. This he took, but it was a rather mortifying issue to his heavy preparations and great expectations, and a long price to pay for putting Torbert on the alert.