[168] I am quite aware of the danger of reasoning from the circumstances of one country to those of another, even in the case of England and the United States. But I avail myself, in support of the text, of the authority of a writer, whose high moral tone, and whose profound knowledge of the constitution on which he has written, unite to make it unnecessary that its history should be written again;--I mean, of course, Mr. Hallam. He pronounces it an extreme supposition, and not to be pretended, that Parliament was ever "absolutely, and in all conceivable circumstances, under the control of the sovereign, whether through intimidation or corrupt subservience." "But," he adds, "as it would equally contradict notorious truth to assert that every vote has been disinterested and independent, _the degree of influence which ought to be permitted_, or which has at any time existed, _becomes one of the most important subjects in our constitutional policy_." (Const. Hist., III. 351.) [169] The position and functions of the judiciary, after proper measures have been taken to secure individual capacity and integrity, do admit and require what may be called absolute confidence. That is to say, their action is not only final and conclusive, but it is never legitimately open to the influence of any other department. The reason is, that their action does not proceed from individual discretion, but is regulated by the principles of a moral science, whose existence is wholly independent of the will of the particular judge. Whereas the action of both the executive and the legislative departments, within the limits prescribed to it by the fundamental law, involves the exercise, to a wide extent, of mere individual discretion. The remedy for a failure in the judge to justify the confidence reposed in him is, therefore, only by impeachment. [170] The legislature of Massachusetts had, before Congress recommended the national Convention, instructed its delegates in Congress not to agree to any modification of the fifth Article of the Confederation, which prohibited the members of Congress from _holding_ any office under the United States, for which they or any other person for their benefit could receive any salary, fee, or emolument. This instruction was repealed, by the unqualified manner in which the State accepted the recommendation for a national Convention. But it shows the sentiment of the State on this point, and it also shows the jealousy that was felt. [171] See the assertion by Mr. Mason, and the admission by Mr. Madison, Elliot, V. 230, 232. [172] Butler, Mason, and Rutledge. [173] Two States only, Connecticut and New Jersey, voted for Madison's amendment. June 23. Elliot, V. 230-233. [174] The disqualification, as applied to members of both houses, was incorporated into one clause. Art. VI. § 9 of the draft of the committee of detail. Elliot, V. 377. [175] See the debate, August 14. Elliot, V. 420-425.