In the plan of government originally proposed by Governor Randolph, the division into the three departments of an executive, a legislative, and a judiciary, implied, for the first of these departments, according to the theory of all governments which are thus separated, power to carry into execution the existing laws. This government, however, was to succeed one that had regulated the affairs of the Union for several years, in which all the powers vested in the confederacy of the States were held and exercised by the Congress of their deputies; and among those powers was that of declaring war and making peace. This function is, moreover, embraced in the general powers of the executive department, in most governments in which there is a regular separation of that department from the legislative and the judiciary. But it became apparent at the very commencement of the process of forming the Constitution of the United States, that the question whether the executive should be intrusted with the power of war and peace would not only be made, but that the system would have to be so arranged as to make the government, in this particular, an exception to the general rule. This was partly owing to an unwillingness to intrust such a power to one person;--or even to a plurality of persons, if the executive should be so constituted. If to the general powers of executing the laws, and of appointing to office, there were to be added the power to make war and peace, and the whole were to be vested in a single magistrate, it was rightly said that the government would be in substance an elective monarchy. The power of the executive, over the external relations of the country at least, would be the same, in kind and in extent, as it is in constitutional monarchies, and the sole difference would be that the supreme magistrate would be elective. This was not intended, and was not admissible. Still another reason for making the government of the United States, in this feature, an exception to the general rule, was the necessity for giving to the States, in their corporate capacities, some control over the foreign relations of the country.