There was another reason for this conduct, which he did not communicate to the British General. A fear had come upon the Portugueze officers during the night, that Loison, whose arrival at Abrantes they knew, would turn upon the northern provinces; the fate of Beja and Evora was before their eyes, and they trembled for Coimbra. Their apprehensions were confirmed by the arrival that night of dispatches from the Governor of Coimbra, communicating to General Freire, as information of the utmost importance, that Laborde’s orders were to amuse the Portugueze army, in order that Loison might pass in their rear and destroy that city; thus, the Governor added, it had been determined in a council of war at Lisbon, and the advice was sent to him by a person upon whom he had entire reliance. It is very possible that the advice came from the French themselves, for the purpose of deceiving him. General Freire began now to fear not only for his own retreat, but even that the English, if they met with a repulse, would be cut off from the Mondego, and unable to retire to their ships. The truth is, that he was unequal to his situation, and having persons about him of as little experience as himself, they confused one another. Concealing from Sir Arthur this, which was the real cause of ♦NEVES, V. 79–81.♦ his vacillation, he chose to separate upon the question of supplies. The danger of the plan was pointed out to him, but in vain: Sir Arthur urged him, equally in vain, to co-operate with the British army in the deliverance of Portugal, if he had any regard to his own honour, to the honour of his country, or of his Prince: he then requested him to send him 1000 infantry, with his cavalry, 250 in number, and his 400 light troops, engaging to feed them; and this was done. He advised him, at all events, to remain at Leiria, or Alcobaça, or any where in the rear of the English, that his troops might not be unnecessarily exposed to destruction; but notwithstanding he was now assured that the English General had found resources in the country fully adequate to their subsistence, he said he should persist in his plan. Sir Arthur, considering it of importance, on political grounds, that the Portugueze troops should accompany his march, would have undertaken to feed them, if he could have relied upon his commissariat; but this, he complained, was so ill [23]composed, as to be incapable of distributing, even to the British troops, the ample supplies which had been procured for them. Freire’s conduct was imputed to an opinion that the English were too weak for the service upon which they were advancing; it was not suspected that he had received intelligence which alarmed him, and which he had withheld from the British commander. He was, however, wise enough to follow the advice which he had at first refused, and remained at Leiria. ♦SKIRMISH NEAR CALDAS.♦