History of the Peninsular War, Volume 3 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 3 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Mr. Canning then proceeded to examine the more general arguments of Mr.
Ponsonby. “It had been argued,” he said, “that before the assistance
of this country had been given to Spain, we ought to have ascertained
whether or not the Spaniards were instigated by the monks; whether
they were encouraged by the higher ranks; whether they were wedded to
their ancient institutions, or disposed to shake off the oppression of
their former government; to abjure the errors of a delusive religion;
and to forswear the Pope and the Grand Inquisitor. The policy of his
Majesty’s government was different. They felt that the Spanish nation
wanted other and more aids than lectures on municipal institutions;
they were content that a British army should act in Spain, though the
Grand Inquisitor might have been at the head of the Spanish armies;
though the people might have been attached to their ancient monarchy,
and with one hand upheld Ferdinand VII., whilst with the other
they worshipped the Lady of the Pillar. God forbid we should be so
intolerant as to make a conformity to our own opinions the price of
our assistance to others, in their efforts for national independence;
to carry the sword in one hand, and what we may choose to call the
Rights of Man in the other! But the enthusiasm of the Spaniards was
not pretended; what they had in their mouths, they felt in their
hearts: they were enthusiastically determined to defend their country
to the last extremity, or to perish under its ruins. The cause was not
desperate; the spirit of the people was unsubdued; the boundaries of
French power were confined within the limits of their military posts;
the throne of Joseph was erected on sand, and would totter with the
first blast; and Buonaparte, even should he succeed, instead of a
yielding and unreproaching ally, would have an impatient, revolting,
and turbulent nation to keep down. The cause was not therefore
desperate, because our army of 30,000 or 40,000 men had been obliged to
withdraw; and it was not just to the country, or to the army, which
he hoped would again prove the stay and bulwark of Europe, to assert
that its honour was in consequence gone for ever. All the energy of
liberty, and all the sacredness of loyalty, still survived; and the
Spanish revolution was, he trusted, destined by Providence to stand
between posterity and French despotism, and to show to the world, that,
amidst the paroxysms of freedom, a monarch might still be loved. If,
therefore, ministers could show that these were the feelings by which
they were influenced, and that they had acted up to these feelings,
their justification would be complete; and he was convinced that the
liberal and disinterested measures of his Majesty’s government towards
Spain were more congenial to British feeling, and more honourable to
the national character, than if they had set out in their career of
assistance by picking up golden apples for ourselves. For himself, as
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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