History of the Peninsular War, Volume 3 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 3 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
This was a triumphant reply. The arguments of the opposition had been
so misdirected, that there was no occasion of subterfuge, sophistry,
or the shield of a majority to baffle them: they were refutable by
a plain statement of facts, where they relied on facts, ... by an
appeal to principles and feelings, where they pretended to philosophy.
Mr. Canning spoke from his heart. There was nothing which he was
required to extenuate or to exaggerate; all that was needful was a
manly avowal of what had been done, and of the reasons why it had been
done. He had a good cause to plead, and he pleaded it with a force
and eloquence worthy of the occasion. The same cause was in effect
♦MR. WINDHAM.♦ pleaded by Mr. Windham, though he took his place in
the opposition ranks, and voted for the inquiry as an opposition
question. “Our expedition to Spain,” he said, “had been so managed as
to produce what was much worse than nothing. What we called our best
army had retreated from the field without striking a blow, on the mere
rumour of the enemy’s advance. We had shown them that our best troops
could do nothing, and therefore that there was little chance of their
undisciplined peasantry succeeding better. There were two courses
which might have been pursued, either that of striking a blow upon the
Ebro while the enemy were weak and their attention distracted, ... or,
if this were hopeless, of proceeding at once upon some general plan
with a view to the final deliverance of the Peninsula. The first was
a mere question on which few but those in office could have the means
of judging. But if the force sent to the Ebro had (as it ought to have
been) been chiefly cavalry (which the enemy most wanted, and we could
best spare), such a force, even if it had been found insufficient for
its immediate object, could have retired in safety to that part of
the Peninsula where, at all events, and in every view, the great mass
of our force should be collected ... the neighbourhood of Cadiz and
Gibraltar. These were the only two places from which a large body of
troops, when pressed by a superior army, could hope to get away; and
there was no other part of Spain to which a British army, large enough
to be of any use, could with propriety be trusted.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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