History of the Peninsular War, Volume 3 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 3 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
where they saw any movement on the opposite bank. At midnight no answer
from Vives had arrived; and Reding, not doubting that it would confirm
the opinion of the council, issued orders that the troops should be in
readiness to commence their retreat as soon as it came. But Vives also
sought to shift the responsibility from himself; and when his answer
arrived, which was not till four in the morning, its purport was, that
Reding was to retire to Ordal if he could not maintain himself on the
Llobregat. Reding now felt that the night had been lost in this ruinous
indecision, and finding the responsibility which he dreaded thrown back
upon him, deemed it better to die where he was than commence a retreat
with the certainty of being instantly and closely pursued. He made
this determination known to the officers who were about his person,
exhorting them to do their duty like true Spaniards, and die in defence
of their country: ♦CABAÑES, P. 3. C. 12.♦ they shook hands with him in
pledge of their promise, and in this temper waited for the attack.
♦DEC. 21.
THE SPANIARDS ROUTED, AND PURSUED TO TARRAGONA.♦
At break of morning on the shortest day in the year, the left wing of
the French under General Souham forded the river at St. Juan d’Espi,
and ascended the right bank to protect the centre, which in like
manner crossed in a line from St. Feliu, opposite to the right of the
Spaniards. The first brigade of the centre effected its passage before
any such intention was perceived or apprehended by their opponents.
The Spaniards could have given no greater proof of negligence than
in leaving undefended points which were so easily defensible, and
upon which the security of their position depended; but in making
dispositions as soon as they discovered the enemy’s movements, they
evinced a degree of skill which convinced the French that there were
officers among them who would have been formidable antagonists had they
commanded troops upon whom they could have relied. The first brigade,
however, was in time to establish itself with little opposition upon
the heights of Llors and S. Coloma; the second followed, and placed
itself at the foot of those heights, masked, in column, and ready to
debouch. Chabot’s troops crossed at the same ford, and marched to the
left of the others, with the intention of turning the Spaniards’ right.
The effect of these movements was, that the Spanish troops, dismayed,
as their officers had anticipated, by the late reverses, easily gave
way: the right was driven back behind the centre; that being attacked
also, was thrown back upon the left toward the bridge; their retreat
upon Villa Franca was cut off by Chabot: a detachment from the French
right, which had crossed at a ford above the bridge, intercepted them
also on the way to Martorell; and if Chabran had then forced the
passage of the bridge, they would have been beset on all sides, and
driven together for slaughter like wild beasts at a royal hunt in the
East.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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