History of the Peninsular War, Volume 3 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 3 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
One other point Mr. Frere adverted to, which, though less important,
was of great weight. The precariousness of commerce, occasioned by the
supposed insecurity of Cadiz, was prejudicial to the finances of Spain.
There was no longer a place in the peninsula where British goods could
be deposited; and the government was therefore under the necessity of
cutting off all mercantile intercourse between the colonies and the
rest of the civilized world, or of affording to foreign commerce a
security which it could not find in the sole protection of a Spanish
garrison. On this head he appealed to the custom-house registers, and
to the applications made by neutrals for permission to reship goods,
which ♦REPLY OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT. FEB. 17.♦ they did not deem
any longer safe. A note was transmitted in reply to this, saying,
that the Junta would dispatch an extraordinary courier to London, and
empower their minister there to settle a point of so much importance
in a manner agreeable to the interests of both nations. Meantime, the
English troops which were at present in the bay, and those which should
arrive there, might disembark, for the purpose of proceeding to Port
St. Mary, San Lucar, Xeres, and the other places proposed for their
cantonment. No misfortune which could happen to the Spanish cause could
prevent the English from falling back on Gibraltar and Cadiz; and this
step would prevent the inconvenience and perhaps sickness to which they
might be exposed by remaining on board ship or in Cadiz, the appointed
stations being in a country the most healthy in the world.
♦THEIR PROPOSAL FOR EMPLOYING THE TROOPS.♦
Having thus considered the convenience of the troops, the Junta
submitted two propositions to Mr. Frere, the only person, they said,
alluding to Sir George Smith’s interference, whom they acknowledged
as the representative of the British nation. First, that the British
troops should proceed to Catalonia, and garrison the maritime ports of
that principality, thus enabling the Spanish army in that quarter to
march to the relief of Zaragoza. Secondly, that they should co-operate
with Cuesta: that general was threatened by a force not very superior
in number to his own, and the assistance of the English might give him
the superiority; thus Cadiz would be secured, and time given to set on
foot the troops who were now only waiting for muskets from England.
The note concluded by expressing a feeling of honourable pain in the
Junta, that England should distrust the safety of Cadiz unless it were
garrisoned by English troops. They asserted, that the constancy and
valour of the Spanish nation, manifested in this arduous struggle,
entitled it to the respect of Europe; and, gently hinting at what had
passed in Galicia, they requested that a veil might be drawn over it.
Cadiz was not situated like Coruña, the same events therefore could not
possibly occur there.
♦CONFERENCE WITH MR. FRERE. FEB. 18.♦
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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