On the 3d of November, Areizaga’s army, consisting of 43,000 foot, 6600 cavalry, and sixty pieces of cannon, began their march from the foot of the Sierra Morena into the plains, taking with them eight days’ provision. The advanced guard, of 2000 cavalry under Freire, were one day’s march in front; the infantry followed in seven divisions, then the rest of the cavalry in reserve, and the head-quarters last, marching from twenty to thirty miles a day; they had no tents, and took up their quarters at night in the towns upon the road. They advanced forces by Daymiel on the left, others along the high road to Madrid, by Valdepeñas and Manzanares. The French retired before them, and in several skirmishes of cavalry the Spaniards were successful. Latour Maubourg escaped with a considerable body of horse from Madrilejos by the treachery of a deserter, who apprised him of his danger just in time for him to get out of the town as the Spaniards entered it. They continued their way through Tembleque to Dos Barrios; then, by a flank march, reached S. Cruz de la Zarza; threw bridges across the Tagus, and passed a division over. Here they took a position; the French pushed their patroles of cavalry near the town, and Areizaga drew out his army in order of battle. An action upon that ground did not suit the enemy, and the Spanish general was frantic enough to determine upon leaving the mountains, and giving them battle in the plain. ♦THE AUSTRIAN COMMISSIONER REMONSTRATES AGAINST HIS PURPOSE. NOV. 16.♦ Baron Crossand, who was employed in Spain on a mission from Austria, was with the army, and, dreading the unavoidable consequences of such a determination, presented a memorial to Areizaga, reminding him, that only the preceding day he had admitted how dangerous it would be thus to hazard the welfare of his country. None of the motives, he said, which should induce a prudent general to risk a battle were applicable in the present case; he had nothing to urge him forward, and the most fertile provinces of Spain were in his rear: by meeting the enemy upon their own ground, the advantage of position was voluntarily given them, and the superiority of numbers which the Spaniards possessed was not to be considered as an advantage, in their state of discipline; so far indeed was it otherwise that the French founded part of their hopes upon the disorder into which the Spaniards would fall in consequence of their own multitude. A victory might procure the evacuation of Madrid and of the two Castilles, but these results were light in the balance when weighed against the consequences of defeat. The wisest plan of operations was to entrench himself upon the strong ground which the left bank of the Tagus afforded; from thence he might send out detachments toward Madrid and in all directions, and act in concert with the Dukes of Parque and Alburquerque, patience and caution rendering certain their ultimate success. ♦BATTLE OF OCAÑA.♦