History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
This retreat surprised Cuesta as much as if his own procrastination
had not deprived Spain of the victory which prompter measures would
have secured. The British General had foreseen the consequence of so
ill-timed a delay, and the disappointment was the more grievous because
he could not pursue the French. From the hour in which he entered
Spain he had never been able to procure means of transport: ... he
required none for the baggage of individuals, ... only for provisions,
ammunition, money, and military stores, things indispensable for an
army: and these were not to be obtained. The country was in a state of
total disorganization; and what was more extraordinary, the government
seemed to be totally ignorant of this, and to suppose that nothing more
was required of it than to issue edicts, which would be carried into
effect as if things were in their ordinary course. This inconvenience
had been so severely felt, that Sir Arthur, before he left Plasencia,
informed Cuesta it would be impossible for him to undertake any farther
operations after their arrangements against Victor should have been
carried into effect, unless the necessary means of transport were
supplied. Justice to his Majesty, and to the army with which he had
been intrusted, required this determination, he said, and he was
equally bound in justice to communicate it to General Cuesta without
delay. The means which he required were such as every country in which
an army was acting was bound to afford; and if the people of Spain were
either unwilling or unable to supply what the British army required,
they must do without its services. This declaration had been made as
early as the 16th; a week had now elapsed, there had not been the
slightest effort to remedy the evil, and from the same cause the troops
were now in actual want of provisions. For the Spanish commissariat was
in the most deplorable state; and that of the British army, which was
far from being in a good one, could effect nothing in a country where
they exerted no authority themselves, and the government would exert
none for them. The evil was aggravated by the junction of two large
armies, in a country which had scarcely ever been without troops to
exhaust it during the preceding twelve months. When the two combined
armies became competitors for food, the inhabitants naturally preferred
their own countrymen: ... it was afterwards discovered also, that, with
a stupid selfishness, which admits neither of justification or excuse,
they concealed the greater part of their stores from both.
♦SIR ARTHUR HALTS.♦
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account