History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Alburquerque would have pursued his success had he not been compelled
to retreat by repeated orders from the commander-in-chief, at the
moment when he was about to attack a disheartened enemy, with troops
confident in their own courage and in the skill of their leader, and
heated by the advantage which they had gained. He had, however, done
much in saving the army, for never were the movements of an army
conducted in a more wretched and disorderly manner; like a rabble upon
a pilgrimage, such was Alburquerque’s description, they proceeded
without any regard to distance, order, or method, and with the whole
park of artillery; they had neither provisions, staff, nor settled
plan; and they stopped upon their marches to repose like flocks of
sheep, without taking up any position, so that, if the French had known
the condition they were in, defeat must have been inevitable whenever
they were unexpectedly attacked. Saved from that total dispersion which
must have ensued, had not Alburquerque thus checked the French in their
career, the Spanish army retreated twenty miles from St. Olalla to the
Alberche unmolested, thus again forming a junction with the British,
and bivouacked on the left bank. At daybreak Sir Arthur crossed, and
having with some difficulty penetrated to the old General’s tent, found
him asleep there, and the army in that state of disorder which is ♦SIR
ARTHUR PREVAILS ON HIM TO CROSS THAT RIVER.♦ usually consequent upon
a forced retreat. He pointed out the necessity of passing the river
without loss of time, and taking up his ground on the right of the
British position. Fortunately Cuesta yielded to this advice, although
he thought it unlikely that the enemy would venture to attack them:
there was a report that they had detached 15,000 men towards Madrid,
and this strengthened his opinion. In fact, had Venegas performed his
part of the concerted operations, either this must have been done by
the French, or Madrid would have fallen. But though this General was
under Cuesta’s orders, and had been instructed how to act in pursuance
of the plan arranged with the British Commander, counter orders were
sent him by the Supreme Junta; and he, in consequence, disconcerted
the whole arrangement by employing himself in a useless cannonade of
Toledo; thus permitting the French to bring their whole force against
the allies.
♦POSITION OF THE ALLIES IN FRONT OF TALAVERA.♦
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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