♦MOVEMENTS OF SOULT, NEY, AND MORTIER.♦ Soult, after his retreat from Galicia, occupied Zamora, Salamanca, and Leon, with the remains of his army, which he had found means to reequip. Ney’s corps was quartered at Astorga, Benevente, and Leon; Mortier’s at Medina del Campo, and Valladolid. Apprised of the movements of the English, Soult gave orders on the 20th for collecting the whole at Salamanca, and four days afterwards was instructed by Jourdan, in the Intruder’s name, to advance as speedily as possible upon the rear of the enemy by way of Plasencia. Sir Arthur, from the commencement of the campaign, was aware of the existence of this force in the north, and the manner in which it would attempt to act. His own army was so small, that it was not possible for him to spare detachments for securing the passes of the long mountain-ridge which the French ♦CUESTA NEGLECTS TO SECURE THE PASSES.♦ must cross. But Cuesta had sent the Marquess de la Reyna, with two battalions from his own army and two from Bejar, to occupy the Puerto de Baños, and given orders to the Duque del Parque to secure the Puerto de Perales, by detachments from Ciudad Rodrigo. The former point Sir Arthur considered safe; but, doubting the Duque’s power to spare a sufficient force for the latter, he directed Beresford, with the Portugueze troops, to defend this pass, as the greatest service which, in their then state of discipline, they were capable of performing. ♦INTELLIGENCE OF SOULT’S ADVANCE.♦ Two days after the battle, intelligence was brought to Talavera that 12,000 rations had been ordered at Fuente Duenas for the 28th, and 24,000 at Los Santos on the same day, for a French army, which it was supposed was on its march to the Puerto de Baños. Cuesta upon this discovered some anxiety respecting that post, and proposed that Sir R. Wilson with his corps should be sent thither. This could not be assented to, for his corps was stationed in the mountains towards Escalona, still keeping up a communication with the people of Madrid, ... an advantage too important to be foregone. Of this Cuesta appeared sensible; yet he could not be prevailed upon to send a detachment from his own army; and Sir Arthur, considering that they had no other grounds for believing this was the point which was threatened than that the rations were ordered, which might be a feint, and hoping too that the troops already there might prove sufficient, and even that the news of his late victory might deter the French from proceeding, did not press the Spanish general further that day. Night brought with it the anxious feeling that a point had now become of prime importance, concerning which he could not be satisfied that proper means had been ♦JULY 31.♦ taken for its defence; and in the morning he again pressed Cuesta upon the subject, urging him to detach thither a division of infantry, with its guns, and a commanding officer on whom he could rely.