have been sold; but their sentence was not definitive. The author or printer might demand a copy of the censure, and lay it before the supreme board: the supreme board might require them to revise their sentence; but their second opinion was to be final. If the book were suppressed, as a private libel, the individual aggrieved had still his remedy at law against the libeller. Some appeal was allowed against the decision of the ordinary. He was not to refuse his license without assigning the ground of refusal, and hearing what the author, editor, or printer could allege in behalf of the work. If he then persisted in his refusal, the person interested might lay his censure before the supreme board, and refer the book to their judgment; if they found it worthy of approbation, their opinion was to be communicated to the ordinary, that he, being better informed upon the matter, might grant the license if he thought good, in order to prevent any farther appeal; but what that was to be was not stated. This was not the only point which, by a sort of compromise, was left doubtful in the decree. The article which empowered the supreme board to reverse the sentence of the provincial ones, declared, as it was originally worded, that upon their approbation the book should freely circulate, and that no tribunal should impede it. Some members upon this required that a proviso should be inserted, declaring this was not intended to intrench upon the authority of the Inquisition. To avoid such a recognition of that baleful power, Luxan proposed that the latter part of the sentence should be omitted, and this was carried by a majority of two votes. It was a victory for the liberal party to leave the question undecided. As soon as the discussion was concluded, a deputy moved that special and honourable mention of the Inquisition should be made in the decree; but the president prevented any debates upon this inflammatory subject by replying, that it might be taken into consideration at some future time.