History of the United States of America, Volume 3 (of 9) : $b During the second administration of Thomas JeffersonAdams, Henry
History
History of the United States of America, Volume 3 (of 9) : $b During the second administration of Thomas Jefferson
Adams, Henry
United States -- History -- 1801-1809; United States -- History -- 1809-1817
Nearly a month was consumed in the necessary preliminaries. Not
until Jan. 28, 1805, were matters so far advanced that Monroe could
present his first note.[10] Following his instructions, he put forward
all the claims which had been so often discussed,--the Spanish and
French spoliations; the losses resulting from suppression of the
_entrepôt_ at New Orleans in 1802; the claim of West Florida,
and that to the Rio Bravo. With the note the two envoys enclosed the
_projet_ of a treaty,--to which could be made only the usual
objection to one-sided schemes, that it required Spain to concede
every point, and offered no equivalent worth mention. Spain was to cede
both the Floridas, and also Texas as far as the Rio Colorado, leaving
the district between the Colorado and the Rio Bravo as a border-land
not to be further settled. She was to create a commission for arranging
the spoliation and _entrepôt_ claims; and this commission should
also take cognizance of all claims that might be made by Spanish
subjects against the United States government.
To this note and _projet_ Don Pedro Cevallos quickly replied.[11]
Availing himself of an inadvertent sentence in Monroe’s opening
paragraph, to the effect that it was necessary to examine impartially
the several points at issue in each case, Cevallos informed the
Americans that in accordance with their wish he would first examine
each point separately, and then proceed to negotiation. He proposed to
begin with the claims convention of August, 1802.
Commonly nothing gratified American diplomatists more than to discuss
questions which they were ordered to take in charge. Yet the readiness
shown by Cevallos to gratify this instinct struck Monroe as a bad sign;
he saw danger of lowering the national tone, and even of becoming
ridiculous, if he allowed the Spaniards to discuss indefinitely claims
which the United States had again and again asserted to be too plain
for discussion. He felt too the influence of Pinckney, who had never
ceased to urge that nothing could be done with the Spanish government
except through fear or force. He could not refuse discussion, but he
entered into it with the intention of promptly cutting it short.[12]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account