History of the United States of America, Volume 3 (of 9) : $b During the second administration of Thomas JeffersonAdams, Henry
History
History of the United States of America, Volume 3 (of 9) : $b During the second administration of Thomas Jefferson
Adams, Henry
United States -- History -- 1801-1809; United States -- History -- 1809-1817
This was the state of the finances when, Jan. 27, 1806, Napoleon called
Marbois and Ouvrard before him. No one charged criminality on any of
the parties to the affair. In truth one person alone was to blame, and
that person was the Emperor himself; but men who served such masters
were always in the wrong,--and in fact Marbois, Ouvrard, Desprez,
and Vanlerberghe accepted their fate. Marbois was disgraced; while
the three others were obliged to surrender all their property under
the alternative of going to Vincennes, with its memories of the Duc
d’Enghien.
The dismissal of Marbois and the ruin of Ouvrard had no immediate
effect on the Florida negotiation. So far from discouraging Armstrong’s
hopes, they seemed at first likely to bring about some arbitrary
decision, after the Emperor’s well-known style of settling questions in
which he had an interest. In the middle of February Armstrong wrote in
some alarm to Madison:[265]--
“All the points in controversy between his Catholic Majesty and
the United States were submitted on the 14th instant to this
Government by the Spanish ambassador, with an order from his
Court to solicit the immediate interposition of the Emperor and
King. That his Majesty will take upon himself the mediation is
not to be questioned; but the form he may think proper to give
to it is a point equally doubtful and important. Should this
movement on the part of Spain have been spontaneous, growing
merely out of her own policy and feelings, there is reason to
believe that I may be able to prevent any sudden and unfavorable
determination from being taken; but if, on the other hand, it
should have been either dictated or invited by this Cabinet, the
presumption is strong that the decision is already taken, and
will present only the alternative,--submission or hostility. Of
the two conjectures, the latter is the more probable.”
For the moment, while Napoleon was struggling with the confusion of
his finances, he held Florida in reserve as a resource for extremity.
Armstrong was officially or semi-officially told that the Emperor
supposed the whole matter of the Spanish-American dispute to be
regularly before him by consent of both parties.[266] He had another
long interview with his unnamed negotiator, who pressed him to accept
Spanish drafts on South America in payment of the claims for Spanish
spoliations, and who argued with much obstinacy that Florida was well
worth ten million dollars to the United States.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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