History of the United States of America, Volume 3 (of 9) : $b During the second administration of Thomas JeffersonAdams, Henry
History
History of the United States of America, Volume 3 (of 9) : $b During the second administration of Thomas Jefferson
Adams, Henry
United States -- History -- 1801-1809; United States -- History -- 1809-1817
Throughout these Spanish negotiations ran a mysterious note of
corruption which probably came not from Cevallos, Godoy, or King
Charles; for Spain was always the party to suffer, and France was
always the party to profit by Spanish sacrifices. That the jobbery had
its origin in Napoleon was improbable, for he too suffered from it.
Neither Napoleon nor Godoy was open to bribery in such a sense; they
were so high in power that small pecuniary motives had no influence
on their acts. Yet the Treasuries both of France and Spain were in
trouble, and were seeking resources. That Talleyrand had private
motives for conniving in their expedients cannot be proved; but in
1805, as in 1798, every attempt to turn negotiation into a job came
from Talleyrand’s intimate circle, the subordinates of the French
Foreign Office.[32] In June, Monroe found at Paris the same hints at
the influence of money which had irritated him in the preceding autumn;
and he wrote to Madison in a tone which showed that he gave them weight.
“I have conferred much,” he said,[33] “with the gentleman
alluded to in my letter from Bordeaux of December 16, and from
what I can gather am led to believe that France has withheld her
opinion on the western limits [Texas], to favor our pretensions
when she thinks proper to take a part in it; that she does not
think it proper so to do in the present stage, or until our
Government acts so as to make Spain apply to her. He thinks
she will then act; and settling the Spanish spoliation business
as by the treaty of 1802, and getting all that can be got for
Florida (he says eight millions of dollars are expected),
promote an adjustment.”
If Jefferson’s administration cared to commit an error of colossal
proportions, it had but to follow the hints of these irresponsible
agents of Marbois and Talleyrand, who presumed to say in advance what
motives would decide the mind of Napoleon. No man in France--neither
Talleyrand nor Berthier, nor even Duroc--knew the scope of the
Emperor’s ambition, or could foretell the expedients he would use or
reject. Monroe’s friend was ill-informed, or deceived him. France had
not withheld her opinion on the western limits; on the contrary, her
opinion had been exactly followed by Spain. Not Talleyrand, much less
Napoleon, but Cevallos himself had withheld that opinion from Monroe’s
knowledge, doubtless because he wished to keep a weapon in reserve for
use at close quarters if his antagonist should come so near. Had Monroe
not been discomfited before Cevallos exhausted his arsenal, this weapon
would certainly have been used for a final blow. Cevallos still held it
in reserve.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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