History of the United States of America, Volume 3 (of 9) : $b During the second administration of Thomas JeffersonAdams, Henry
History
History of the United States of America, Volume 3 (of 9) : $b During the second administration of Thomas Jefferson
Adams, Henry
United States -- History -- 1801-1809; United States -- History -- 1809-1817
The senators received this rebuff with ill-concealed annoyance.
Jefferson’s act in refusing to consult them about a matter so
important as a British treaty--and one which from the first had been
their own rather than the President’s scheme--was another instance of
the boldness which sometimes contradicted the theory that Jefferson
was a timid man. To ordinary minds it seemed clear that the President
needed support; that he could not afford single-handed to defy England
and France; that the circle of foreign enemies was narrowing about
him; and that to suppress of his own will a treaty on which peace and
war might depend, exposed him to responsibilities under which he might
be crushed. Although the treaty was not yet published, enough had
been said to make senators extremely curious about its contents; and
they were not pleased to learn that the President meant to tell them
nothing, and cared too little for their opinion to ask it. Of all the
senators the most formidable intriguer was Samuel Smith of Maryland,
who wrote the next day confidentially to Wilson Cary Nicholas a letter
full of the fresh impressions which gave life to Smith’s private
language:[305]
“A copy of the treaty arrived last evening. The President is
angry with it, and to Dr. Mitchill and Mr. Adams (who carried
the last message) expressed his anger in strong, very strong
terms, telling in broad language the cause of his wrath. He
requested the doctor to tell the senators his objections. If
the doctor repeated correctly, then I must be permitted to
think there was not a little of the heightening. He said the
President was at present determined to send the original back
the moment it shall be received, without submitting it to the
Senate. He was sick, it is true,--vexed and worried; he may
think better of it, for Madison (expecting less than he had)
differs with him as to calling the Senate, and R[obert] S[mith]
concurs in opinion with M[adison].... I stopped here, and I have
seen the President and Mr. M[adison]. It seems the impressment
of seamen was a _sine qua non_ in the instructions. The
P[resident] speaks positively that, without full and formal
satisfaction shall be made thereupon, he will return the treaty
without consulting the Senate; and yet he admits the treaty,
so far as to all the other points, might be acceptable,--nay,
that there are but few exceptions to it in his mind. I fancy
the merchants would be perfectly pleased therewith. If then in
all other points it would please, will the responsibility not
be very great on him should he send it back without consulting
the Senate? M[adison] in answer to this query said, ‘But if he
is determined not to accept, even should the Senate advise,
why call the Senate together?’ I could give no answer to this
question. If by his unusual conduct the British continue or
increase their depredations (which he cannot prevent), what
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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