Jefferson’s idea that Napoleon would require two years of war seemed reasonable; for how could Jefferson know that Ulm had already surrendered, that Austerlitz would be fought within six weeks, and that peace would be restored before the new year, with the Emperor Napoleon more terrible than ever? In truth Jefferson only reverted to his policy of peace which he had seemed to abandon, but to which he really clung even when most earnest for a British alliance. His conduct in that sense was at least consistent. So much could hardly be said for Madison, even though the President apparently yielded to the secretary’s advice. Of all the points on which Madison, and Monroe in obedience to his orders, had most strongly insisted, even to the extent of offending Talleyrand, the strongest was that under no circumstances should the Florida negotiation be turned into a bribe to France. As late as September 30, in writing the opinion intended to guide the Cabinet, Madison asked authority “to extinguish in the French government every hope of turning our controversy with Spain into a French job, public or private.”[69] The President’s suggestion of October 23 avowedly turned the controversy with Spain into a French job, which must inevitably become private as well as public. Madison made no protest. He soon returned to Washington, and there, Nov. 12, 1805, a Cabinel meeting was held, whose proceedings were recorded by the President in a memorandum, probably written at the moment. This memorandum closed a record, unusually complete, of an episode illustrating better than any other the peculiarities of Jefferson and Madison, and the traits of character most commonly alleged as their faults.[70]