The political outlook took the same sombre tone as the finances. The failure of the Spaniards and the evacuation of Spain by the British army after the loss of Sir John Moore at Corunna, January 16, destroyed confidence in all political hopes. Lord Castlereagh, as war-secretary, was most exposed to attack. Instead of defending him, Canning set the example of weakening his influence. Aware that the Administration had not the capacity to hold its own, Canning undertook to reform it. As early as October, 1808, he talked freely of Castlereagh’s incompetence, and made no secret of his opinion that the Secretary for War must go out.[39] Whether his judgment of Castlereagh’s abilities were right or wrong was a matter for English history to decide; but Americans might at least wonder that the Convention of Cintra and the campaign of Sir John Moore were not held to be achievements as respectable as the American diplomacy of Canning or the commercial experiments of Spencer Perceval. Canning himself agreed that Perceval was little, if at all, superior to Castlereagh, and he saw hope for England chiefly in his own elevation to the post of the Duke of Portland. Although no one fully understood all that had been done by the Portland ministry, enough was known to render their fall certain; and Canning saw himself sinking with the rest. He made active efforts to secure his own safety and to rise above the misfortunes which threatened to overwhelm his colleagues. Among other annoyances, he felt the recoil of his American policy. The tone taken by Pinkney coincided with the warlike threats reported by Erskine, and with the language of Campbell’s Report to the House of Representatives. Erskine’s despatch of November 26, in which Campbell’s Report was enclosed, and his alarming despatches of December 3 and 4 were received by Canning about the middle of January,[40] at a time when the Ministry was sustained only by royal favor. The language and the threats of these advices were such as Canning could not with dignity overlook or with safety resent; but he overlooked them. January 18, at a diplomatic dinner given by him on the Queen’s birthday, he took Pinkney aside to tell him that the Ministry were willing to consider the Resolutions proposed in Campbell’s Report as putting an end to the difficulties which prevented a satisfactory arrangement.[41] Pinkney, surprised by Canning’s “more than usual kindness and respect,” suggested deferring the subject to a better occasion; and Canning readily acquiesced, appointing January 22 as the day for an interview.