Jefferson’s estimate of Washington’s abilities was lower than that commonly accepted; and his rule that a President’s responsibility ceased after giving an order, besides ignoring the President’s responsibility for the selection of agents, seemed to destroy the foundation of the public service. “I never doubted that the plans of the President were wise and sufficient,” wrote Jefferson to Monroe.[347] “Their failure we all impute, (1) to the insubordinate temper of Armstrong, and (2) to the indecision of Winder.” The rule that an administrator might select any agent, however incompetent, without incurring responsibility for the agent’s acts, was one which in private affairs Jefferson would hardly have accepted. Yet Jefferson’s opinions probably expressed Republican sentiment in Virginia, and showed better than any other evidence the course of thought among Madison’s friends. In that respect his expressions retained permanent value. The Virginians were willing to throw off responsibility for public disaster; and they naturally threw it on New England, since New England challenged it. Writing to his friend William Short, Jefferson spoke of the threatening attitude of Massachusetts:[348]-- “Some apprehend danger from the defection of Massachusetts. It is a disagreeable circumstance, but not a dangerous one. If they become neutral, we are sufficient for one enemy without them, and in fact we get no aid from them now.” Probably most Virginians shared this belief, at least so far as concerned the aid rendered by Massachusetts to the war. In truth, Massachusetts gave little aid, and made a profession of her wish to give none at all; but the difficulty did not end there. Massachusetts and Virginia were States of the first class. The census of 1810 allotted to Massachusetts, including Maine, a population of about seven hundred thousand; to Virginia, a white population of five hundred and fifty-one thousand, and a colored population of four hundred and twenty-three thousand,--nine hundred and seventy-four thousand in all. In the ratio of representation Massachusetts counted for twenty, Virginia for twenty-three. The quota of Massachusetts in the direct tax was $316,000; that of Virginia was $369,000. On the scale furnished by these data, Virginia should have contributed in support of the war about one eighth or one seventh more men and money than were required from Massachusetts. The actual result was different.