History of the United States of America, Volume 8 (of 9) : $b During the second administration of James MadisonAdams, Henry
History
History of the United States of America, Volume 8 (of 9) : $b During the second administration of James Madison
Adams, Henry
United States -- History -- 1801-1809; United States -- History -- 1809-1817
AT the beginning of the year 1814, the attitude of New England
pleased no one, and perhaps annoyed most the New England people
themselves, who were conscious of showing neither dignity, power,
courage, nor intelligence. Nearly one half the people of the five New
England States supported the war, but were paralyzed by the other half,
which opposed it. Of the peace party, one half wished to stop the war,
but was paralyzed by the other half, which threatened to desert their
leaders at the first overt act of treason. In this dead-lock every one
was dissatisfied, but no one seemed disposed to yield.
Such a situation could not last. In times of revolution treason might
be necessary, but inert perversity could at no time serve a useful
purpose. Yet the Massachusetts Federalists professed only a wish to
remain inert. Josiah Quincy, who fretted at restraints, and whose
instincts obliged him to act as energetically as he talked, committed
his party to the broad assertion that “a moral and religious people”
could not express admiration for heroism displayed in a cause they
disapproved. They would defend Massachusetts only by waiting to be
invaded; and if their safety depended on their possessing the outlet
of Lake Champlain, they would refuse to seize it if in doing so
they should be obliged to cross the Canadian line. With one accord
Massachusetts Federalists reiterated that until their territory should
be actually invaded, they would not take arms. After January 1, 1814,
when news of the battle of Leipzig arrived, the dreaded invasion of New
England became imminent; but the Federalists, officially and privately,
insisted on their doctrine of self-defence.
“In the tumult of arms,” said Governor Strong in his speech to
the legislature, January 12, 1814, “the passions of men are
easily inflamed by artful misrepresentations; they are apt to
lose sight of the origin of a contest, and to forget, either
in the triumph of victory or the mortification of defeat, that
the whole weight of guilt and wretchedness occasioned by war is
chargeable upon that government which unreasonably begins the
conflict, and upon those of its subjects who, voluntarily and
without legal obligation, encourage and support it.”
The Massachusetts Senate echoed the sentiment in language more
emphatic:--
“Beyond that submission which laws enacted agreeably to the
Constitution make necessary, and that self-defence which the
obligation to repel hostile invasions justifies, a people can
give no encouragement to a war of such a character without
becoming partakers in its guilt, and rendering themselves
obnoxious to those just retributions of Divine vengeance by
which, sooner or later, the authors and abettors of such a war
will be assuredly overtaken.”
The House of Representatives could see but one contingency that
warranted Massachusetts in making voluntary exertion:--
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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