The most practicable routes were Nicaragua and Panama. The Nicaragua way was between three and four times the longer--183 miles to 49; 38 hours from ocean to ocean as against 12. The Panama way was straighter, had less elevation at its summit, and required fewer locks. Congress finally decided to construct a high level lock-canal. The cost of keeping up and operating a Panama canal was estimated at six-tenths that of one across Nicaragua. Harbor expenses and facilities would be nearly the same for both lines. The time required for construction, probably nine or ten years, would be a trifle the less at Nicaragua. Control works, to keep always the proper depth of water in the canal, could be more easily maintained at Panama. Panama political and commercial complications were serious. The isthmus was Colombia territory, and, since October, 1899, a civil war had been raging in that republic. Its financial condition was desperate. Two hundred million inconvertible paper pesos had depreciated to the value of two cents each in gold, yet were legal tender for all obligations. In such a country, especially as war was in progress, the only government able to maintain itself was despotic. Civil troubles were intensified by dissension between Catholics and Protestants. Revolution accompanied any change in administration. Under Ferdinand de Lesseps, creator of the Suez Canal, the French company had performed extensive excavations at Panama. The New Panama Canal Company of France held certain concessions from the Colombian government. The value of its assets was $109,000,000 at most. If we dug at Nicaragua these would be worth little. Besides, a Nicaragua canal completed, some $6,000,000 of stock owned by the French company in the Panama railroad would dwindle in value. The validity of the French company's rights was questioned. Its agreement to work some each year had not been kept. Its charter was to expire in October, 1904, but, for 5,000,000 francs, the Colombia President granted a six-year extension. Even with this the French franchise would revert to Colombia in 1910. Colombia wished delay. The United States transcontinental railroads did not want a canal, as it would divert from them heavy, bulky, and imperishable freight. They therefore joined Colombia in seeking delay, playing off the Nicaragua plan against the Panama, hoping to defeat both. Late in 1901, newspapers in the United States began urging the purchase from Colombia of a land belt across the isthmus to be United States territory. Our Senate, December 16, 1901, by a vote of 72 to 6, ratified the Hay-Pauncefote treaty with Great Britain, in which it was agreed that we should build a canal, allowing all other nations to use it. Meantime, spite of the fact that the Walker commission had recommended Nicaragua route, public sentiment began to favor Panama. Even the Walker commission changed to this view.