[Footnote 8: Some difficulty was experienced in finding certain specialists, such as farriers, &c.] [Footnote 9: Of this original force from England, all cavalry and artillery units and eleven infantry battalions went out with a "war establishment, plus excess numbers," which were calculated at 10 per cent. to make good casualties for the first three months. It was decided to adopt this standard in all cases.] [Footnote 10: The reserve of the artillery fell short almost at once, whereas the entire reserves of the cavalry were not called out until the end of February, 1901.] [Footnote 11: For one battalion alone, the 2nd battalion Royal Irish Rifles, 1,831 duly qualified soldiers left England in six months, without having to draw on any reserves outside its own corps.] [Footnote 12: Memorandum on Drafts prepared in the Adjutant-General's department, 30th September, 1902. See Appendix volume, Royal Commission, p. 86.] Short service had made it possible to build up a reserve substantial enough to minister to the unprecedented requirements of the regular army for a year. Without it, the end of our resources in trained men would have been reached at a very early stage. [Sidenote: Borrowing, with results.] One difficulty arose. Staffs of many formations, such as those of mounted infantry, ammunition columns and medical field units, did not exist. The completion of these new creations for the original field force necessitated the borrowing of officers and men from other bodies, which, as was supposed at that time, would not be mobilised. As the strain continually grew more severe it was found necessary to mobilise successive divisions and additional batteries. Then, not only had the loans to be made good to those depleted, but nearly the whole of the personnel had to be found for the further number of fresh organisms which were called into existence. This could only be done by yet more borrowing. The difficulty, therefore, progressively increased. More particularly was this the case with the ammunition columns, the creation of which, together with the additional batteries of artillery, caused a drain on artillery reservists, which resulted in their being absorbed more quickly than those of the other branches of the service.[13] All these special bodies, though essential for war, were outside the peace establishment of the army. It became, therefore, necessary to call out "the whole of the remainder of the Army Reserve, in order to be able to utilise the services of reservists belonging to Section D., none of whom could, by law, be called out until all the reservists of all arms, in Sections A. B. and C. had been called up."[14] This was done by special Army Order on December 20th, 1899.[15]