various Colonial Governments a grateful acceptance by Her Majesty's Government of the services of their contingents, indicating in each case the units considered desirable. It was not found possible to take advantage of the offers of some of the Crown Colonies, but from the self-governing Colonies, troops numbering about 2,500 of all ranks were accepted.[49] These proved but the advance guard to the total force of nearly 30,000 men from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and Ceylon, who at various times represented Greater Britain in the army of South Africa. [Footnote 47: The corps mobilised were Natal Naval Volunteers, Natal Field Artillery, Natal Royal Rifles, Durban Light Infantry, Natal Mounted Rifles, Natal Carbineers, Umvoti Mounted Rifles, Border Mounted Rifles.] [Footnote 48: For the local forces called out in Cape Colony, see Chapter II., p. 53.] [Footnote 49: For arrivals of "Oversea Colonials," see Appendix 9. The whole subject is treated more fully in Vol. II. in a chapter on the Colonial Corps.] CHAPTER II. THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR.[50] [Footnote 50: See general map of South Africa, Relief map No. 2, and map No. 3.] [Sidenote: Defence plans of local authorities.] [Sidenote: Genl. Goodenough.] It has been convenient to carry the statement of the measures adopted for preparation at home in certain matters beyond the actual date of the declaration of war. It is now necessary to view the state of affairs in South Africa at that time. Although British preparations for war had been retarded by the hope of the Queen's Government that the grave issues with the Dutch Republics might be determined by diplomatic action, yet the weakness of our military position in South Africa had long been felt as keenly by the local military authorities as it had been by the Headquarter staff at the War Office. In schemes for the defence of the British colonies, submitted in 1896 and 1897 by Lieut.-General Sir W. H. Goodenough, who was then commanding in South Africa, the extraordinary extent of the frontiers to be defended, the disadvantages entailed by their shape, and the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Boers over the handful of British troops then in South Africa, made it necessary to base the protection even of the most important strategical points on sheer audacity. [Sidenote: War Office to Gen. Butler Dec. /98.] [Sidenote: Dec. /98, from W.O.]