History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Castaños was with the divisions of Coupigny and La-Peña at
Calahorra on the 19th, when he received information that a French
corps was advancing upon Logroña. It was Lasnes’, with Lagrange’s
and Colbert’s troops, but the Spaniard concluded it to be Ney, for
he was ignorant of the changes which had taken place since the 8th
of the month. It was likewise reported, that Moncey, whose force
he estimated at twelve thousand, when it really was above twenty
thousand, had concentrated at Lodosa, and, at the same time, the
bishop of Osma announced that twelve thousand men, under Dessolles,
were marching from the side of Aranda de Douero. On the 21st, the
intelligence that Dessolles had passed Almazan, and that Moncey
was in motion, was confirmed. Then Castaños, relinquishing his
offensive projects, prepared to retire, and it was full time. For
marshal Ney, who left Aranda on the 19th, had passed Almazan on
the 20th, dispersed several small bands of insurgents, and entered
Soria on the 21st, so that when Castaños determined to fall back
on the 21st, his flank was already turned, and his retreat upon
Madrid in the enemy’s power. His artillery was at Centruenigo, and
a large detachment of his army was with O’Neil at Caparosa.
[Sidenote: Castaños’ Official Account of the Battle of Tudela.]
During the night of the 21st and 22d he retired to the heights
which extend from Tudela by Cascante, Novellas, Taranzona, and
Monteguda. The advanced guard of Lasnes was in sight of the
Spanish rear-guard at Calahorra on the morning of the 22d. At
this moment the only supply of money which the central junta had
yet transmitted for the use of the army arrived at Tudela, and,
to complete the picture of distracted councils, O’Neil refused to
fall back from Caparosa without the orders of the captain-general.
The latter, however, fortunately arrived at Tudela in person, and
a conference taking place between him and Castaños the same day,
they agreed that the Aragonese army should cross the Ebro, and
occupy the heights over Tudela, while the rest of the troops should
stretch away in line as far as Taranzona; but in defiance of all
orders, entreaties, or reasoning, the obstinate O’Neil remained in
an olive wood on the right bank of the river during the night of
the 22d, leaving the key of the position open to the enemy.
[Sidenote: Ibid, and his Vindication.]
A council of war was held, but the discussion was turbulent, and
the opinions were discordant. Palafox insisted on the defence of
Aragon, as the principal, or rather the only object to be attended
to, and he wished the whole army to pass to the left bank of the
Ebro, and confine its operations to the protection of Zaragoza on
that side, a proposal which alone was sufficient to demonstrate his
total incapacity for military affairs. Castaños reasoned justly
against this absurdity, but the important moments passed in
useless disputation, and the generals came to no conclusion.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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