Vast as this plan of campaign appears, it was not beyond the emperor’s means; for without taking into consideration his own genius, activity, and vigour, he counted on his muster-rolls, above three hundred and thirty thousand men, and above sixty thousand horses; above two hundred pieces of field artillery followed the corps to battle, and as many more remained in reserve. Of this monstrous army, two hundred and fifty-five thousand men, and fifty thousand horses, were actually under arms, with their different regiments; thirty-two thousand were detached or in garrisons, preserving tranquillity in the rear, and guarding the communications of the active force. The remainder were in hospital, and so slight had been the resistance of the Spanish armies, that only nineteen hundred prisoners were to be deducted from this multitude. Of the whole host, two hundred and thirteen thousand were native Frenchmen, the residue were Poles, Germans, and Italians. Of the disposable troops, thirty-five thousand men and five thousand horses were appropriated to Catalonia, and about the same number to the siege of Zaragoza. Above one hundred and eighty thousand men, and forty thousand horses, were therefore available for any enterprise, without taking a single man from the service of the lines of communication. What was there to oppose this fearful array? What consistency or vigour in the councils? What numbers? What discipline and spirit in the armies of Spain? What enthusiasm among the people? What was the disposition, the means? What the activity of the allies of that country? The answers to these questions demonstrate, that the fate of the Peninsula hung at this moment upon a thread, and that the deliverance of that country was due to other causes than the courage, the patriotism, or the constancy of the Spaniards. [Sidenote: Infantado’s Letters. Narrative of Moore’s Campaign.] First, with regard to their armies. The duke of Infantado resided among, rather than commanded, a few thousand wretched fugitives at Cuenca, destitute, mutinous, and cowed in spirit. At Valencia there was no army, for that which belonged to the province was shut up in Zaragoza, and dissensions had arisen between Palafox and the local junta in consequence. [Sidenote: Stuart’s and Frere’s Letters.] [Sidenote: Sir J. Moore’s Papers.] [Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, Section 5.]