History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
With respect to the operations by the line of the Tagus, which
were to drive Joseph out of Madrid, and consequently to attract
the attention of all the French corps, it is to be observed, that
sir John Cradock could command about twelve thousand men, Cuesta
sixteen thousand, Cartoajal twelve thousand, making a total of
forty thousand. Now, Soult had twenty-three thousand, Lapisse
nine thousand, Victor was at the head of twenty-five thousand,
Sebastiani could dispose of fifteen thousand, Mortier of a like
number, the King’s guards and the garrison of Madrid were twelve
thousand, making a total of nearly a hundred thousand men.
But while Mr. Frere and colonel D’Urban, confiding in Soult’s
inactivity, were thus plotting the destruction of Victor and
Sebastiani, the first marshal stormed Oporto; the second,
unconscious of his danger, crossed the Tagus, and defeated Cuesta’s
army at Medellin, and at the same moment Sebastiani routed
Cartoajal’s at Ciudad Real.
BOOK VII.
CHAPTER I.
Having described the unhappy condition of Portugal and given a
general view of the transactions in Spain, I shall now resume the
narrative of Soult’s operations, thus following the main stream
of action, for the other marshals were appointed to tranquillize
the provinces already overrun by the emperor, or to war down the
remnants of the Spanish armies; but the duke of Dalmatia’s task was
to push onward in the course of conquest. Nor is it difficult to
trace him through the remainder of a campaign in which traversing
all the northern provinces, fighting in succession the armies of
three different nations, and enduring every vicissitude of war, he
left broad marks of his career and certain proofs that he was an
able commander, and of a haughty resolution in adversity.
It has been observed, in a former part of this work, that the
inhabitants of Coruña honourably maintained their town until the
safety of the fleet which carried sir John Moore’s army from the
Spanish shores was secure; but they were less faithful to their own
cause. Coruña, although weak against a regular siege, might have
defied irregular operations, and several weeks must have elapsed
before sufficient battering train could have been brought up to
that corner of the Peninsula. Yet, a short negotiation sufficed to
put the French in possession of the place on the 19th of January,
and the means of attacking Ferrol were immediately organized from
the resources of Coruña.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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