The two Spanish armies, if they had been united, would have furnished about twenty-six thousand infantry, and five thousand cavalry, and they had no reserve. The two French corps, united, would have exceeded thirty-five thousand fighting-men, supported by the reserve under the king. The French, therefore, had the advantage of numbers, position, and discipline. Following the orders of Napoleon, marshal Victor should have been at Merida before the middle of February. In that position he would have confined Cuesta to the Sierra Morena; and with his twelve regiments of cavalry he could easily have kept all the flat country, as far as Badajos, in subjection. That fortress itself had no means of resistance, and, certainly, there was no Spanish force in the field capable of impeding the full execution of the emperor’s instructions, which were also reiterated by the king. Nevertheless, the duke of Belluno remained inert at this critical period, and the Spaniards, attributing his inactivity to weakness, endeavoured to provoke the blow so unaccountably withheld; for Cuesta was projecting offensive movements against Victor, and the duke of Albuquerque was extremely anxious to attack Toledo from the side of La Mancha. Cartoajal opposed Albuquerque’s plans, but offered him a small force with which to act independently. The duke complained to the junta of Cartoajal’s proceedings, and Mr. Frere, whose traces are to be found in every intrigue, and every absurd project broached at this period, having supported Albuquerque’s complaints, Cartoajal was directed by the junta to follow the duke’s plans: but the latter was himself ordered to join Cuesta, with a detachment of four or five thousand men. ROUT OF CIUDAD REAL. Cartoajal, in pursuance of his instructions, marched with about twelve thousand men, and twenty guns, towards Toledo; and his advanced guard attacked a regiment of Polish lancers, near Consuegra: but the latter retired without loss. Hereupon, Sebastiani, with about ten thousand men, came up against him, and the leading divisions encountering at Yebenes, the Spaniards were pushed back to Ciudad Real, where they halted, leaving guards on the river in front of that town. The French, however, forced the passage, and a tumultuary action ensuing, Cartoajal was totally routed, with the loss of all his guns, a thousand slain, and several thousand prisoners. The vanquished fled by Almagro; and the French cavalry pursued even to the foot of the Sierra Morena. This action, fought on the 27th of March, and commonly called the battle of Ciudad Real, was not followed up with any great profit to the victors. Sebastiani gathered up the spoils, sent his prisoners to the rear, and, holding his troops concentrated on the Upper Guadiana, awaited the result of Victor’s operations: thus enabling the Spanish fugitives to rally at Carolina, where they were reinforced by levies from Grenada and Cordova.