History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The flooding of the Tagus and the rocky nature of its bed had
injured the raft-bridge near Almaraz, and delayed the passage of
the artillery and stores; to remedy this inconvenience the marshal
issued directions to have a boat-bridge prepared, and caused a
field-fort to be constructed on the left bank of the Tagus, which
he armed with three guns, and garrisoned with a hundred and fifty
men to protect his bridge. These arrangements and the establishment
of an hospital for two thousand men at Truxillo, delayed the first
corps until the 24th of March.
Meanwhile, the light cavalry reinforced by twelve hundred
_voltigeurs_ were posted at Miajadas, and having covered all
the roads branching from that central point with their scouting
parties, reported that a few of Cuesta’s people had retired to
Medellin, that from five to six thousand men were thrown into the
Sierra de Guadalupe, on the left of the French; that four thousand
infantry and two thousand cavalry were behind the river Guadiana,
in front of Medellin, but that every thing else was over the
Guadiana.
The line of retreat chosen by Cuesta uncovered Merida, and,
consequently, the great road between Badajos and Seville was open
to the French; but Victor was not disposed to profit from this,
for he was aware that Albuquerque was coming from La Mancha to
Cuesta, and believing that he brought nine thousand infantry and
two thousand cavalry--feared that Cuesta’s intention was either
to draw him into a difficult country, by making a flank march to
join Cartoajal in La Mancha, or by crossing the Guadiana, above
Naval Villar, where the fords are always practicable, to rejoin his
detachments in the Sierra de Guadalupe, and so establish a new base
of operations on the left flank of the French army.
This reasoning was misplaced; neither Cuesta nor his army were
capable of such operations, his line of retreat was solely directed
by a desire to join Albuquerque, and to save his troops, by
taking to a rugged instead of an open country, and the duke of
Belluno lost the fruits of his previous success, by over rating
his adversary’s skill; for, instead of following Cuesta with a
resolution to break up the Spanish army, he, after leaving a
brigade at Truxillo and Almaraz, to protect the communications, was
contented to advance a few leagues on the road to Medellin with
his main body, sending his light cavalry to Merida, and pushing
on detachments towards Badajos and Seville, while other parties
explored the roads leading into the Guadalupe.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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