For the same reason the course of conquest was to have proceeded from Portugal to Andalusia, which would then have been assailed in front and flank at one moment, while the fourth corps held the Valencians in check. By this plan the French would never have lost their central position, nor exposed their grand line of communication to an attack. 2º.--That this plan, so wisely conceived in its general bearing, should fail without any of the different corps employed having suffered a defeat, nay, when they were victorious in all quarters is surprising, but not inexplicable. It is clear that Napoleon’s orders were given at a time when he did not expect that a battle would have been fought at Coruña, or that the second corps would have suffered so much from the severity of the weather, and the length of the marches, neither did he anticipate the resistance that was made by the Portuguese, between the Minho and the Douro. The last error was a consequence of the first, for his plans were calculated upon the supposition that the rapidity of Soult’s movements would forestall all defence; yet the delay cannot be charged as a fault to that marshal whose energy was conspicuous. 3º.--Napoleon’s attention, divided between Austria and Spain, must have been somewhat distracted by the multiplicity of his affairs. He does not seem to have made allowance for the very rugged country through which Soult had to march, at a time when all the rivers and streams were overflowing, from the constant rains; and as the combinations of war are continually changing, the delay thus occasioned rendered Lapisse’s instructions faulty: for, although it be true, that if the latter had marched by Guardia, upon Abrantes, while Soult advanced to Lisbon, by Coimbra, and that Victor entered the Alemtejo, Portugal would have been conquered without difficulty; yet the combination was so wide, and the communications so uncertain, that unity of action could not be insured. Soult, weakened by the obstacles he encountered, required reinforcements after the taking of Oporto; and Lapisse should have considered himself as rather belonging to Soult than Victor, and have marched upon Viseu; the duke of Dalmatia would then have been strong enough to fight his own battle without regard to the operations in the Alemtejo.