4º.--The first error of the French, if the facts are correctly shewn, must, therefore, be attributed to Napoleon, because he overlooked the probable chances of delay, combined the operations on too wide a scale, and gave Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, instead of Lamego and Viseu, for the direction of Lapisse’s march. I say, if the facts are correctly shewn, for it is scarcely discreet to censure Napoleon’s military dispositions, however erroneous they may _appear_ to have been, and it is certain that, in this case, his errors, if errors they were, although sufficient to embarrass his lieutenants, will not account for their entire failure. Above sixty thousand men were put in motion by him, upon good general principles, for the subjugation of Lisbon; and we must search in the particular conduct of the generals for the reason why _a project of Napoleon’s, to be executed by sixty thousand French veterans, should have ended as idly and ineffectually as if it had been concocted by the Spanish junta_. OBSERVATIONS ON THE SEPARATE OPERATIONS OF LAPISSE, VICTOR, SOULT, ROMANA, SYLVEIRA, AND CUESTA. LAPISSE. 1º.--An intercepted letter of general Maupetit, shews the small pains taken by Lapisse to communicate with Soult. He directs that _even so many_ as three hundred men should patrole towards Tras os Montes, to obtain information of the second corps, at a time when the object was so important that his whole force should have moved in mass rather than have failed of intelligence. 2º.--The manner in which he suffered sir Robert Wilson to gather strength and to insult his outposts was inexcusable. He might have marched straight upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and dispersed every thing in his front; one of those fortresses would probably have fallen, if not both, and from thence a strong detachment pushed towards Lamego would not only have ascertained the situation of the second corps, but would have greatly aided its progress by threatening Oporto and Braga. It cannot be urged that Salamanca required the presence of a large force, because, in that open country, the people were at the mercy of Bessiere’s cavalry; and so sensible were the local junta of this, that both Salamanca and Ledesma refused assistance from Ciudad Rodrigo, when it was offered, and preferred a quiet submission.