History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Cuesta was, however, so popular in Estremadura, that the central
junta, although fearing and detesting him, consented to his being
placed at the head of Galluzzo’s fugitives, part of whom had,
when the pursuit ceased, rallied behind the Guadiana, and were
now, with the aid of fresh levies, again taking the form, rather
than the consistence, of an army. This appointment was an act
of deplorable weakness and incapacity. The moral effect was to
degrade the government by exposing its fears and weakness; and, in
a military view, it was destructive, because Cuesta was physically
and mentally incapable of command. Obstinate, jealous, and stricken
in years, he was heedless of time and circumstances, of disposition
and fitness. To punish with a barbarous severity, and to rush
headlong into battle, constituted, in his mind, all the functions
of a general.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, section 2d.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13. Vol. I.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, section 2.]
The president, Florida Blanca, being eighty-one years of age, died
at Seville, and the marquis of Astorga succeeded him; but the
character of the junta was in no manner affected by the change.
Some fleeting indications of vigour had been produced by the
imminence of the danger during the flight from Aranjuez, but a
large remittance of silver, from South America, having arrived
at Cadiz, the attention of the members was so absorbed, by this
object, that the public weal was blotted from their remembrance,
and even Mr. Frere, ashamed of their conduct, appeared to acquiesce
in the justness of sir John Moore’s estimate of the value of
Spanish co-operation.
The number of men to be enrolled for the defence of the country had
been early fixed at five hundred thousand, but scarcely one-third
had joined their colours; nevertheless, considerable bodies were
assembling at different points, because the people, especially
those of the southern provinces, although dismayed, were obedient,
and the local authorities, at a distance from the actual scene
of war, rigorously enforced the law of enrolment, and sent the
recruits to the armies, hoping thereby either to stave the war off
from their own districts, or to have the excuse of being without
fighting men, to plead for quiet submission.
The fugitive troops also readily collected again at any given
point, partly from patriotism, partly because the French were in
possession of their native provinces, partly that they attributed
their defeats to the treachery of their generals, and partly
that, being deceived by the gross falsehoods and boasting of the
government, they, with ready vanity, imagined that the enemy had
invariably suffered enormous losses. In fine, for the reasons
mentioned in the commencement of this history, men were to be had
in abundance; but, beyond assembling them and appointing some
incapable person to command, nothing was done for defence.
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