Sir Arthur Wellesley landed the 22d of April, and, on the 24th, signified to the British ministers that, affairs being in the condition contemplated by them, it was his intention to assume the command of the army; a circumstance worthy of attention, as indicating that the defence of Portugal was even then considered a secondary object, and of uncertain promise. The deliverance of the Peninsula was never due to the foresight and perseverance of the English ministers, but to the firmness and skill of the British generals, and to the courage of troops whom no dangers could daunt and no hardships dishearten, while they remedied the eternal errors of the cabinet. The unexpected arrival of a man known only as a victorious commander created the greatest enthusiasm in Portugal. The regency immediately nominated him marshal-general of their troops. The people, always fond of novelty, hailed his presence with enthusiasm; and all those persons, whether Portuguese or British, who had blamed sir John Cradock’s prudent caution, now anticipating a change of system, spake largely and confidently of the future operations: in truth, all classes were greatly excited, and an undefined yet powerful sentiment that something great would soon be achieved pervaded the public mind. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. 16.] Sir Arthur’s plans were, however, neither hastily adopted nor recklessly hurried forward; like Cradock, he felt the danger of removing far from Lisbon while Victor was on the Alemtejo frontier, and he anxiously weighed his own resources against those at the enemy’s disposal. Not that he wavered between offensive and defensive movements, for a general of his discernment could not fail to perceive that, if the French were acting upon any concerted plan, the false march of Lapisse to Merida had marred their combinations, by placing a whole nation, with all its fortresses and all its forces, whether insurgents, regular troops, or auxiliaries, between the armies of Victor and Soult, and that neither concert nor communication could longer exist between those marshals. Soult’s offensive strength, also, was evidently exhausted; he might establish himself firmly in the provinces beyond the Douro, but he could not, alone, force his way to Lisbon, a distance of two hundred miles, in a season when the waters were full, and through a country tangled with rivers, mountains, and defiles. He could not hope, with twenty-four thousand men, to beat a whole people in arms, assisted by an auxiliary army of as high reputation, and nearly as numerous as his own; and, moreover, there were discontents and conspiracy in his camp; and of this sir Arthur was aware.